A model of consumer choice by Magrabi, Frances Marie
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1962
A model of consumer choice
Frances Marie Magrabi
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Magrabi, Frances Marie, "A model of consumer choice " (1962). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 2064.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/2064
This dissertation has been 62-4166 
microfilmed exactly as received 
MAGRABI, Frances Marie, 1927-
A MODEL OF CONSUMER CHOICE. 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology 
Ph.D., 1962 
Economics, theory 
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 
A MODEL OF CONSUMER CHOICE 
by 
Frances Marie Magrabi 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major Subject : Consumption Economics 
Approved: 
In (Charge of Major J Work 
Head of Major Department 
of^GfaMate College Deal 
Iowa State University 
Of Science and Technology 
Ames, Iowa 
1962 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. PREFACE 1 
II. CONSUMER CHOICE RESEARCH 5 
A. Forms.of Research Models 7 
1. Methods of research .7 
2. Applications of research 10 
B. The Utility Approach 13 
1. Utility functions 14 
2. Constraints 16 
3. Maximization of utility 17 
4. Relationships presupposed by utility 
functions 18 
C. Content of Consumer Choice Research 21 
1. Demand for commodities 22 
2. Utility measurement 24 
3. Consumer goals and values 25 
4. Factors related to choice 26 
D. A Situational Approach 28 
1. Form 28 
2. Relationship to theory 29 
3. Content 29 
E. Similarities of Choice Models 30 
III. MODELS 32 
A. Definition 32 
B. Scientific and Personal Models 36 
1. Consistency 39 
2. Transmissibility 4u 
3. Manner of application to real situations 4l 
C. Formulation of Problems 42 
ill 
rage 
IV. THE ENVIRONMENT OF CHOICE 47 
A. The Decision Maker 47 
1. Perceiver 48 
2. Pattern maker 48 
3. Ordering agent 50 
B. Activity Patterns 50 
1. Regularity, duration, and change 52 
2. Location in time and space 53 
3. Elaboration of activities 54 
C. Planes of Living 55 
1. Physical measurement of planes 56 
2. Preferences for planes 57 
D. Decision and Choice 60 
1. Definitions 60 
2. Elements and relationships in choice 6l 
3. Statement of the choice problem 64 
V. ELEMENTS OF CHOICE 65 
A. Objectives 67 
1. Definition of objectives 67 
2. Relationships among objectives 73 
B. ' Alternatives 79 
1. Definition 80 
2. Identification of alternatives within 
the decision situation 8l 
C. Characteristics 83 
1. Variation 83 
2. Effectiveness of variants 84 
3. Identification and measurement 87 
iv 
Page 
VI. RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE CHOICE SITUATION 92 
A. Structure 92 
1. Inclusion 92 
2. Measure 93 
3. Mapping 93 
B. Content 94 
1. Physical relationships 94 
2. Preference relationships 96 
3. Time 98 
4. Space 100 
VII. INFORMATION 102 
A. Definition 102 
B. States of Completeness 105 
1. Global information 105 
2. Complete information 106 
3. Partial information 107 
C. States of Certainty 107 
1. Certainty 108 
2. Uncertainty 108 
3. Risk 109 
D. Cost of Information 110 
VIII. A MODEL OF CHOICE 112 
A. Choice Under Conditions of Complete 
Information 112 
1. Assumptions 112 
2. The set of alternatives 113 
3. Characteristics 114 
4. Sets of characteristic variants 114 
5. Relationships among characteristic 
variants 115 
6. Preference ordering of unimportant 
characteristics 117 
7. Partial ordering of alternatives by 
characteristic variants 118 
V 
rage 
8. Feasible subsets 120 
9. Preferred subsets 121 
10. Decision rules 122 
11. Interpretation of partitions 124 
12. Relationship between characteristics 
and objectives 130 
13. Relationships among characteristics, 
alternatives, and planes 133 
B. Choice Under Conditions of Incomplete 
Information 139 
1. Assumptions 139 
2. Relationships under uncertainty or 
risk 142 
3. Decision rules 143 
4. Application of incomplete information 
model in research 146 
IX. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL IN RESEARCH 14? 
A. Areas of Applicability 14? 
1. Purposes of analysis 148 
2. Content of choice 150 
3. Conditions to be met 154 
B. Selection of Data 157 
1. Necessary data 157 
2. Sources of data 162 
3. Timing of data collection 163 
C. Objectives of Analysis 164 
D. A Proposed Application of the Model 167 
X. SUMMARY 171 
XI. GLOSSARY 177 
XII. SELECTED REFERENCES 189 
XIII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 194 
1 
I. PREFACE 
To the individual consumer, choice is a recurring prob­
lem and one on which much of his welfare depends. His free­
dom to select from an assortment of goods and services is a 
potential for obtaining either a maximum or a minimum of 
comfort, security, and philanthropic giving. Choice has 
significance in every aspect of the consumer's life and af­
fects his total environment, including other individuals, 
groups, and social structures. It is no wonder, then, that 
choice behavior has been studied from many points of view and 
with a variety of techniques. Some of these types of choice 
research are discussed in the second chapter. 
Research in the area of consumer choice contributes to 
human welfare in several ways. It extends information about 
an area of behavior which has far reaching effects in the 
daily living of consumers, in the degree to which they a-
chieve their long term goals, and in the satisfaction which 
they enjoy. It enables policy makers in business and govern­
ment to predict choices in the future and make recommenda­
tions with respect to product offerings, characteristics of 
the nonprice offer, and uses of products. 
A consideration of individual choice research makes it 
apparent that further development is possible, particularly 
in the study of situational elements which constrain choice 
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and the characteristics of outcome which the consumer wishes 
to maximize. The major purpose of this dissertation is to 
define elements of the choice situation in such a way that 
multiple constraints and desired characteristics can be 
measured and an analysis made of their interaction in de­
termining choice. From this foundation, empirical studies 
may be designed, but this is beyond the scope of the disser­
tation. 
In pursuance of this objective, a terminology of choice 
is defined and discussed. Three criteria have been applied 
in the selection and definition of terms : (a) the proposed 
elements must be capable of being observed and recorded as 
research data, (b) from the proposed elements it must be pos­
sible to formulate hypotheses which have significance for 
understanding and predicting choice, and (c) statistical 
techniques of analysis must be applicable. 
General considerations in the study of choice are pre­
sented in Chapter II where research models are defined as an 
application of theory to real data and several types of 
choice research are discussed in that respect. The proposed 
model is then defined as a special application of theory to 
choice behavior. The third chapter is devoted to a consider­
ation of characteristics of models and the functions which 
they serve. 
Chapter IV is a discussion of some general characteris­
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tics of models and the functions which they serve. 
Chapter IV is a discussion of some general characteris­
tics of the choice environment, including the decision maker. 
Some of these aspects are described in more detail in the 
next three chapters as elements and relationships of choice, 
and information, which is the decision maker's perception of 
his choice situation. Interaction of choice elements is ex­
plicated in Chapter VIII, together with conclusions concern­
ing characteristics of chosen alternatives. The final chap­
ter is a discussion of practical considerations relevant to 
applying the model in research. 
A glossary is appended to aid the reader in understand­
ing words which have been given specialized meanings. Many 
of these terms have been defined and discussed in the body of 
the thesis, but, in order to avoid repetition and follow a 
logical organization, words have sometimes been used before 
they were defined. Use of the glossary should prevent con­
fusion. 
This dissertation has been written entirely from the re­
search point of view. Descriptions of the decision maker and 
his situation should be regarded, not as conclusions about 
how things really are, but as a way of looking at reality 
which may be useful in formulating research problems. The 
proposed model should be examined to see whether it is 
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intuitively reasonable and logically sound, but its final 
justification will be its usefulness as a basis for choice 
research. 
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II. CONSUMER CHOICE RESEARCH 
Choice studies are concerned with behavior in relation 
to situations which include a set of alternatives from which 
one must be chosen by the decision maker. If choice behavior 
is to occur, the set of alternatives must include at least 
two from which the decision maker is able and willing to 
choose. Moreover, the decision maker must be aware of at 
least two such feasible and desirable alternatives and must 
weigh their relative advantages and disadvantages. Choice 
studies are not limited to the study of genuine choice be­
havior, not only because of the practical difficulties of 
distinguishing it from other behavior but also because in­
formation about choice behavior is applicable to many pur­
poses even though the decision maker may have seriously con­
sidered only one alternative. 
Consumer choice behavior is a selection from among al­
ternatives, with consumption of goods or services being in­
cluded in or implied by each alternative. Decisions about 
purchase are included in the definition, as well as decisions 
about use and disposal of goods. 
Choice may be viewed in either a static or a dynamic 
context. On the one hand one may examine the logic of 
choice, the elements which enter into a decision and their 
relatedness, the choices that are made and the persons who 
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make them, and the results of those choices. This is the 
static viewpoint. One might, on the other hand, observe how 
choices are made and how the choice situation and the decision 
maker change during the choice-making process. This is a 
'••vt 'dynamic view of choice. Each of these has its particular 
contribution to make in the solution of social problems and 
the extension of knowledge. 
The kinds of studies designated in this dissertation as 
consumer choice research are investigations of choice in a 
static context. Elements are observed and measured without 
regard to time sequence. Time relationships are observed as 
static elements. Studies of the dynamic aspects will be 
termed decision making or decision process research, and will 
not be discussed. 
Before attempting to set up a research model, it seems 
wise to take an overview of research, its general nature, and 
its relationship to other kinds of activity and knowledge. 
In applying research models, data are examined in light of 
theory, that is, they are compared with a conceptual struc­
ture. These data are selected, identified, manipulated, and 
interpreted in a particular way; they are represented in a 
model in such a way that theoretic statements may be made 
about them. Research may be discussed in the contexts of 
(a) the form of model used, i.e., analytic and synthetic ap­
proaches proposed as a bridge between real and theoretic, 
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methods used, and uses to which conclusions may be put, (b) 
theories relevant to the research, and (c) the real world 
from which data are to be drawn. 
A. Forms of Research Models 
Scientific research is planned and carried out with 
method and application or use in mind.^ These vary with the 
environment, but may nevertheless be categorized in such a 
way that specifications of a satisfactory model might be 
based on them. 
1. Methods of research 
Selection and manipulation of data are planned according 
to the purposes for which the research is conducted. Inter­
pretations are made and conclusions are stated with respect 
to one or more particular objectives, for example, to de­
scribe, relate, contrast or compare, and predict. 
Description is the identification of inclusion relation­
ships, that is, membership in a set. Suppose the research 
worker has conceptualized a set of elements having distinct 
subsets. He may wish to categorize data by identifying them 
with subsets, or he may wish to test the hypothesis that 
certain data are identified with certain subsets. Descriptive 
1Russell L. Ackoff. The design of social research. 
Chicago, 111., The University of Chicago Press. 1953. 
p. 15-
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research yields information, either in extensive form, as the 
enumeration of data, or in summaries using frequency distri­
butions, values of the mean, median, or mode, the range or 
the variance. Description may be the sole purpose of re­
search, or it may be a preliminary to further study. 
The research worker may gather data for the purpose of 
identifying and measuring mapping relationships among ele­
ments, and testing the hypothesis that specific relationships 
are present. These may be cause and effect relations between 
elements, or simply association. Regression methods might be 
used to estimate these relationships. 
To contrast or compare is to measure deviations from 
congruence. Real elements and relationships.may be con­
trasted with theoretic ones, or two sets of the real may be 
contrasted. A predicted measure may be contrasted with an 
observed measure, or different observations of a single real 
element or relationship may be contrasted to measure varia­
tion or error in measurements. Several elements may be con­
trasted for the purpose of identifying sets or subsets and, 
in this way, inclusion relationships may be conceptualized. 
Similarly, contrast may be helpful in conceptualizing map­
ping relationships. Factorial experiments are methods of 
contrasting relationships. 
Finally, research may be undertaken for the purpose of 
prediction, i.e., the assignment of measures to unobserved 
9 
relationships. Predictions may be made on the basis of anal­
ogy or deduction. Reasoning in the first case proceeds as 
follows: the observed environment appears to be congruent 
with the unobserved in specified respects, therefore rela­
tionships of interest will be congruent; or, the observed en­
vironment is incongruent with the unobserved to a certain 
degree in some relationships, therefore it will be incongru­
ent to a proportionate degree in other relationships. Rea­
soning by deduction proceeds by drawing theoretic conclusions 
and applying them to data fitted into a model. To take a 
simple example from marginal utility theory, if the price of 
one good is substantially increased, the consumer whose 
choices are at equilibrium at one set of prices will move to 
a new equilibrium set of choices in which quantities pur-
1 
chased of that good are reduced. Applying this conclusion 
to data fitted to a model of price changes and consumer re­
sponse, one can predict that increased price will lead to de­
creased sales. To predict the proportionate or absolute de­
crease in sales, analogies with previous responses may be 
made. 
These methods may be used singly, or several may be used 
in one research project. They may correspond to steps in the 
-Ljohn R. Hicks. A revision of demand theory. London, 
England, Oxford University Press. 1956. p. 60. 
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analysis of data which first involves description, then re­
lationships among categories of data may be measured, and, 
finally, contrasts may be observed and predictions developed. 
Some criteria are proposed in Table 1 for identifying 
the appropriateness and efficiency of research models with 
respect to several purposes for which studies may be con­
ducted. 
2. Applications of research 
The undertaking of research presupposes a problem; the 
findings are intended to be used, directly or indirectly in 
the solution of that problem. Three basic uses may be de­
fined as understanding, recommendation, and prediction. 
Often the conclusions of research are used for nothing 
but to understand and comprehend an environment or process. 
Such research is often intended as preparation for formula­
ting a problem having imperfectly known structure or content. 
Conclusions may be used to predict conditions. Predic­
tion as well as understanding is sometimes a preliminary to 
an ultimate use, which is to recommend courses of action. 
This is the use to which scientific research should finally 
contribute, though it may be indirectly and it may happen 
that this use is not made. Research into consumer behavior 
is used to make recommendations with respect to production of 
goods, marketing procedures and conditions, purchase and use 
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Table 1. Criteria for appropriateness of research models 
Criteria Purpose sought 
1. The categories or subsets with 
which data are to be identified 
must be exhaustive and exclusive, D R Ce Cr 
in the sense that no data are 
left uncategorized or are iden­
tified with more than one category. 
2. The categories or subsets "must 
be defined in such a way as to DR Ce Cr 
correspond with elements of the 
problem. 
3. A sufficiently large number of 
categories or subsets must be 
conceptualized in the model to D R Ce Cr 
provide a satisfactory solution 
of the problem. 
4. The cost of categorizing and sum­
marizing data must meet relevant D R Ce Cr 
criteria. 
5. The selection of relationships 
measured must be such as to provide 
a satisfactory solution to the R Cr 
problem. 
6. The cost of measuring relation­
ships must satisfy relevant R Cr 
criteria specified in the problem. 
7. The selection of elements to con­
trast must be such as to provide a Ce Cr 
satisfactory solution to the problem. 
a 
aD represents description. 
R represents relation. 
Ce.represents contrast between elements. 
Cr represents contrast between relations. 
P represents prediction. 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Criteria Purpose sought3-
8. The cost of contrasting elements 
must satisfy relevant criteria Ce 
specified in the problem. 
9. The selection of relationships to 
contrast must be such as to provide Cr 
a satisfactory solution to the 
problem. 
10. The cost of contrasting relation­
ships- must satisfy relevant cri- Cr 
teria specified in the problem. 
11. Prediction must achieve a degree 
of precision and certainty such as P 
to provide a satisfactory solution 
to the problem. 
12. Measure scales must satisfy pre­
cision and certainty criteria 
specified in light of the re­
searcher's definition of an ac- R Ce Cr P 
ceptable solution; a statement of 
measure should include the degree 
to which these criteria are met. 
13. The cost of meeting precision and 
certainty criteria must satisfy R Ce Cr P 
relevant criteria specified in 
the problem. 
of goods by consumers, and government regulation of the pro­
duction, marketing, and use of goods. In use the findings of 
research are a part of the real environment. 
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B. The Utility Approach 
Theories of consumer choice are based on utility theory. 
An alternative is chosen because it is "better" than all 
others, i.e., it yields more satisfaction, has greater util­
ity for the consumer. If further explanation of the nature 
of utility seems useful, it may be argued in a manner such as 
the following: elements or alternatives have utility because 
they have certain desirable characteristics, desirable be­
cause of their relationship with characteristics of the con­
sumer, i.e., his wants or needs. This shifts the burden of 
definition to theories of the consumer where, perhaps, the 
burden properly belongs. In theories of choice the assump­
tion is made that consumers do in some manner impute some­
thing called utility to alternatives. 
Theories of consumer choice are theories of constrained 
choice: (a) given a set of elements having a particular 
preference order and (b) given a set of relationships con­
straining choice to a subset of those elements, (c) optimum 
choice is identified by an application of (b) to (a). In the 
following subsections preference order of alternatives is 
discussed under utility functions, then price and income con­
straints are stated. Finally, two ways of relating utility 
functions and constraints are indicated. 
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1. Utility functions 
According to Armstrong, 
...the economists' assumption with regard to 
choice may be expressed as the assumption that for 
any given individual at a given moment there is a 
function, which we will call the utility function 
of the alternatives, any of which could conceivably 
be presented to the individual, and this function 
determines an indifference class of alternatives... 
The utility function, then, is one capable of ordering a set 
of alternatives into indifference classes. Armstrong is 
careful to limit utility functions to specific individuals 
at specific times. He does not make the assumption that an 
indifference class determined by a utility function will be 
the same as that determined if the same set of alternatives 
were presented to the consumer at another time or were pre­
sented to a different consumer. In research models based on 
utility theory, assumptions about the comparability of util­
ity functions between persons and over time may be needed. 
If the purpose of the study is.to describe a population by 
observing a sample of persons, and if the conclusions depend 
on the assumption that each person in the sample chooses in 
accordance with a utility function, then in some sense those 
utility functions must be assumed to have applicability not 
•^W. E. Armstrong. The determination of utility func­
tions. Economic Journal 59: 453-467. 1939. p. 454. 
merely to single individuals at a specific point in time but 
to a group of persons during a period of time. Similar as­
sumptions must be made if the purpose of research is to re­
late, predict, or contrast. 
Suppose the alternatives to be ordered by the utility 
function are combinations of consumer goods in different 
quantities. One may conceptualize the utility function as 
U = f(x1, Xg,..., xn) (1) 
where x^ (i = 1, 2,..., n) are quantities of n different con­
sumer goods and U is a quantity which completely orders the 
set of alternatives. Then for any pair of alternatives, each 
containing a specific quantity of each consumer good, the 
utility function determines which alternative is preferred, 
that is, has the greater utility. 
It follows from (l) that for any pair of goods Xj_ and 
Xj, a marginal rate of substitution can be determined which 
is the quantity of Xj which could be substituted for the 
marginal unit of x± without changing the value of U. Margi­
nal rate of substitution may be defined in different ways; 
intuitively, it means that for any good x^ there must be some 
quantity of any other good xj for which the consumer could be 
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induced to exchange a unit of x^.1 But while marginal rate 
of substitution is derived as a concept from the utility 
function, it can be measured without measuring utility. 
2. Constraints 
If there were no constraints on the x^, then U would 
presumably be unlimited and there would be no possibility of 
optimum choice, since no matter what combination of the Xj_ 
were identified, there would always exist other combinations 
yielding higher utility. The only utility functions of in­
terest in reference to a model of choice are therefore func­
tions in which the Xj_ are constrained in some way, that is, 
there must be limits to the measured quantities in which 
goods are available as alternatives. If the admissible Xj_ 
are goods which may only be obtained by an expenditure of re­
sources, then the utility function is a basis for the choice 
problem. 
Suppose only a single constraint is effective, the price 
and income one. This might be written as 
n 
Y > 2. PiXi (2) 
1 —J-
where Y is money income, appropriately defined, and Pj_ is the 
1For alternative definitions see John R. Hicks. Value 
and capital. 2nd ed. London, England, Oxford University 
Press. 1946. p. 20. Also see Kenneth E. Boulding. Econom­
ic analysis. 3rd ed. New York, N. Y., Harper and Brothers. 
1955. P. 685. 
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money cost to the consumer of units of the ith good. Then 
(2) constrains choice to a set of alternatives, each of which 
is a combination of goods which costs no more than the con­
sumer's money income. 
Suppose that the use of goods requires the expenditure 
of several resources in addition to money, for example, time 
and space. Perhaps the goods may not even be purchased with­
out expenditure of time and space. Then there may be collec­
tions of goods which are feasible choices with respect to 
their money cost, but which may not be chosen because of time 
or space limitations. Unless these constraints are stated as 
part of the model, they must be taken as an assumption. 
3. Maximization of utility 
If U = f(xj_) orders alternatives by preference, and the 
only constraint is the price-income one, then 
V = v [f(xj, Y, p1x1] (3) 
identifies the alternative having the maximum utility for the 
consumer from the feasible set. 
The preferred feasible alternative might also be iden­
tified using marginal rate of substitution. If n = 2, then 
the alternative having the maximum utility is the one in 
which X]_ and x2 are present in quantities such that the mar­
ginal rate of substitution of x^ for Xg equals the ratio of 
18 
their prices, and the sum of their money costs equals in­
come .1 
Individual demand for a commodity is the quantity of 
that good which a given consumer will purchase at a particu­
lar price and income level. Aggregate demand is the quantity 
which a group of consumers will purchase at a particular 
price level and distribution of income and is a sum of in­
dividual demand curves. 
Demand may be measured in reality by collecting data on 
the consumer's actual behavior, or it may be constructed 
theoretically, given appropriate measures of marginal rates 
of substitution at a range of prices and incomes. The in­
dividual demand curve indicates a collection of alternatives, 
each having the highest utility of any in the feasible set, 
for given measures of pj_ with pj and Y remaining fixed or 
for given Y with pj_ and pj fixed. 
4. Relationships presupposed by utility functions 
While the utility function, appropriately defined, is 
satisfactory as a theoretic framework for choice and demand 
analysis, for some purposes it may be useful to examine other 
relationships in the decision situation, relationships which 
may be said to underlie the utility function. In the first 
1Hicks, Value and capital, p. 20. 
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place, there may be constraints, other than the price and 
income one, which limit the field of choice. If they are ef­
fective at all, it may be well to examine their relationship 
to the utility function. Second, the statement that collec­
tions of goods have utility for the consumer may sometimes be 
less useful than an analysis of incidence of goods in differ­
ent situations. Further, suppose that the availability of 
time and space not only affects feasibility of alternatives, 
but also is a determinant of U, that is, the amount of utili­
ty yielded by a given alternative depends not merely on 
quantities of goods but on time and space expenditure as 
well. Then for each different allocation of time and space 
there must be a different utility function; any particular 
U = f(xj_) must assume some allocation of time and space. 
Utility may be dependent on factors other than quanti­
ties of goods, time, and space. Utility may vary according 
to kinds and quantities of goods already owned, personal 
characteristics of the consumer, his family and other asso­
ciates, the community in which he lives, and perhaps other 
environmental characteristics. If these factors are not 
enumerated in the utility function, then particular environ­
mental conditions must be assumed for any given utility func­
tion. 
A utility function comprehending all factors affecting 
20 
utility can be described.1 If the purpose of research is 
descriptive and analytic, complete enumeration may be useful. 
However, as a basis for demand functions, all factors other 
than quantity of goods, prices, and income might be included 
in those differences among consumers which make generaliza­
tion of utility functions invalid. Or, if the purpose is to 
construct a decision model, the enumeration might be limited 
to factors from whose variations the decision maker can ef­
fectively choose. 
For some purposes it may be useful to look at relation­
ships which underlie preferences for goods. At one level of 
generalization, preference can be described as a hierarchy 
of wants, with preferences for goods derived from their 
capability of fulfilling wants. At a more detailed level, 
preference may be conceptualized in relation to. planes of 
living, each of which is an environmental pattern encompass­
ing all the activities of the consumer. Preference is an 
ordering of the set of all those planes of living from which 
a decision maker might conceivably choose. Preferences among 
goods and quantities of goods would be a reflection of pref­
erence for the planes of living of which they form a part. 
Ipor example, see Joseph Gartner. An application of 
economic models to consumer marketing programs. Unpublished 
Ph. D. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Library, Iowa State University 
of Science and Technology. 1961. 
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If the larger quantity of a good were part of a more highly 
preferred plane of living, it would be preferred over the 
smaller quantity. 
These preference relationships, derived from a hierarchy 
of wants or planes of living, are antecedent to any utility 
function which describes utility as a function of quantities 
01 goods or of other environmental factors. For. some specif­
ic purposes, these antecedent relationships, rather than the 
utility function itself, may be more usefully studied. 
G. Content of Consumer Choice Research 
Some subject areas in which there has been choice re­
search are commodity demand, measurement of utility, goals 
and values, and related factors. These areas might also be 
described as answering the questions: What is chosen? What 
value does it yield? Why was it chosen? and What additional 
factors constrain or otherwise influence choice? There are 
also studies of individual and group choice making procedures. 
These latter will not be discussed, since the present purpose 
has to do with static analysis of individual choice situa­
tions. The first four types of research mentioned above will 
be described just sufficiently to identify some research areas ' 
closely related to the approach proposed in this disserta­
tion. 
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1. Demand, for commodities 
In a mass production economy where the bespoke article 
of consumption tends to be the exception rather than the 
rule, studies of demand provide needed information. Commod­
ities are produced without any commitment from buyers; if 
these goods are then purchased by the potential consumer, 
well and good, if not the results are social waste and busi­
ness losses. Losses suffered by individual firms may be of 
concern to only a small number of people, but they may also 
have indirect effects in other industries as well. If, for 
example, the automobile makers fail to anticipate consumers' 
tastes in tail fins' and are unable to sell their products, 
the rubber and steel industries may suffer loss of profits. 
Social waste is less easy to measure; yet unproductive use of 
resources, both human and nonhuman, has unfortunate results 
in human welfare which are observable. 
Some of the same general statements may be made concern­
ing demand for services. Skills may need to be acquired well 
in advance of demand for them, equipment may need to be pur­
chased, and at the very least a residence must be maintained 
by the potential employee in the geographic area where con­
tinued demand for his services is anticipated. 
It is of private and social importance both to individ­
ual consumers and to business firms, to measure and predict 
demand for consumer goods. At one level, the purpose of 
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research may be limited to the description of demand. This 
may be expressed in total quantities of goods purchased by 
consumers, total quantities purchased at each price at which 
the goods are offered, average quantity purchased per con­
sumer, or In some other summary form. Such descriptions may 
be helpful as a means of understanding the environment, but 
they may also be used as a basis for prediction or recommen­
dation. For example, suppose a producer is willing to assume 
that the factors causing a particular good to be purchased in 
a particular total quantity will not change within the next 
ten years. Then, if he knows the current demand, he can 
predict demand for the entire ten-year period. If he assumes 
that all factors other than price will be unchanged, and if 
he has a description of demand at several price levels, then 
he can predict demand at any of these prices. 
Evidently descriptive research makes a minimum use of 
theory. However, the research elements are identified with 
theoretic ones, and price is recognized implicitly as a con­
straining factor. 
If the purpose of demand research is to measure rela­
tionships between several factors, then their simultaneous 
variation must be observed and measured. For example, the 
relationship of demand with price and income may be measured 
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using regression methods.^ The resulting measures of rela­
tionships may be used in projection, as in forecasts of 
demand. Or contrasts may be made, for example, between 
projected and actual measures as when forecasted demand is 
compared with a^"^ measures of demand, or between several 
actual measures as when the price elasticity of bread is com­
pared with that of meat. Models having these purposes may be 
drawn directly from utility theory, with utility assumed to 
have the form indicated in the preceding section and price 
and income as the only constraint. From this the demand re-
2 lationships may be derived. 
2. Utility measurement 
Prediction of demand as a function of constraining fac­
tors gives useful results and avoids the problem of measur­
ing utility; yet in some research problems one would like to 
bring in the utility function in a more direct fashion. For 
example, suppose one wants to formulate a rule of choice 
among alternatives which have no effective constraints, such 
as two goods having identical prices. In such a case choice 
is made on the basis of "payoff" or utility yield. 
"'"Herman Wold. Demand analysis. New York, N. Y., John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1953. pp. 9-11. 
2 James M. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt. Microeconom-
ic theory. New York, N. Y., McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 
1958. pp. 20-22. 
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Models for such purposes may require the measurement of 
utility. While this area is not well developed, some studies 
pertinent to the purpose have been made. For example, 
Davidson and Suppes report an experimental measure of utili­
ty based on expressed preferences among outcomes having dif­
ferent probabilities of occurring."*" 
3. Consumer goals and values 
Another approach to consumer choice is to investigate 
characteristics of the consumer which cause alternatives to 
have utility for him. These characteristics are his goals 
and values and environmental characteristics which cause or 
are associated with goals and values. Goals are the outcomes 
which the consumer wishes to have realized; values are ele­
ments in a set of goals defined at a higher level of ab­
straction. 
The usefulness of such research is apparent: if utility 
is a function of goals and values, and if goals and values 
can be measured independently of choice, then choices may be 
predicted or actual choices evaluated without measuring 
either utility or relationships between choice and con­
straints. The directness of such an approach has an 
Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes and Sidney Siegel. 
Decision making: an experimental approach. Stanford, Cali­
fornia, Stanford University Press. 1957. 
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intuitive appeal and avoids, moreover, some -errors and in­
adequacies inherent in demand analysis and utility measure­
ment . 
Techniques used in goals and values research include 
description and contrast. Goals and values are difficult to 
define with operational precision; however, since description 
is a necessary first step to other forms of analysis, much of 
the research in this area has been descriptive. However, 
where the descriptive data are assumed to be adequate, they 
may be used for predicting choice or for contrasting actual 
choice with that indicated on the basis of goals and values. 
Goals and values research predicates that, utility is 
primarily a function of goal fulfillment rather than of the 
alternative chosen. In this it differs from demand analysis. 
4. Factors related to choice 
Some environmental factors, for example, population 
traits, seem to be related to choice although they are 
neither utility producing, constraining, nor the goals of 
^As examples of this kind of research see the following: 
Glenn H. Beyer. Housing and personal values. N. Y. (Ithaca) 
Agricultural Experiment Station Memoir 364. 1959. Glenn H. 
Beyer, Thomas W. Mackesey and James E. Montgomery. Houses 
are for people: a study of home buyer motivations. Cornell 
University Housing Research Center. Research Publication 3. 
1955. Virginia F. Cutler. Personal and family values in the 
choice of a home. N. Y. (Ithaca) Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin 840. 1947. 
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choice. As an example, consider kind and level of education, 
previous experiences, kind and neighborhood of residence. 
These factors may well be related to some choices and worth 
study. 
These studies vary in structure and might have their 
theoretical basis in several of the social sciences. How­
ever, studies might be based on special forms of the utility 
function; for example, consider 
%r = f(%i) 
where Ur is utility derived from reading and x^ are cultural 
factors such as years of formal education. This is quite 
different from the utility function mentioned in earlier sec­
tions which states that the utility experienced is a function 
of choice. The special form states that the utility of 
choices is a function of certain cultural factors. The first 
form is concerned with the causes of choice, the special form 
with the causes of utility. 
These studies might be used for predictions based either 
on simple description or on projections of measured relation­
ships. More often, perhaps, they are used to enlarge the un-
1 derstanding of individual and social behavior. 
1Albert Lauterbach. Man, motives, and money. 2nd ed. 
Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press. 1959. p. 239• 
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D. A Situational Approach 
The model to be proposed in this dissertation can now be 
classified by structure, relationship to theory, and content. 
It will be seen to resemble models for demand research, 
though having some points in common with other models. Bas­
ically, the proposed model defines alternatives as bundles of 
characteristics, rather than of commodities; its purpose may 
be that of identifying a function of the characteristics 
which best discriminates between chosen and rejected alterna­
tives . 
1. Form 
Like studies of demand, the ultimate purpose of the pro­
posed model is projective. The elements are to be described, 
relationships among them measured, and projections of these 
relationships made. But like studies of goals and values and 
of other factors related to choice, description of elements 
is difficult and essential. Indeed, the elements measured 
and related in the proposed model may be the same as some of 
those used in goals and values research or studies of social 
factors related to choice. 
A primary use of the proposed model is to extend and im­
prove the research worker's comprehension of choice as it 
relates to the consumer and his situation. It is intended to 
answer the question, "Why were particular alternatives 
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chosen?" It may also be used to predict choice or recommend 
policies with respect to control of situational elements. In 
other words, it may predict what will be chosen under changed 
circumstances or how the circumstances may be changed to en­
courage the acceptance of particular choices. 
2. Relationship to theory 
Basically, in the proposed model, choice depends on the 
constrained utility function 
U = f(xi) 
with each Xj_ constrained within certain limits. The x^ of 
this function are characteristics of alternatives rather than 
quantities of goods. They might include characteristics such 
as money cost, time requirements, color, flavor, and the 
like. 
3. Content 
The content of the proposed model includes the entire 
choice situation, although in a practical situation only 
those elements might be included which can be conveniently 
and precisely measured and which significantly affect choice. 
Among these might be money, price, and quantity of certain 
commodities, variables relating to goals and values, and 
cultural factors. 
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E. Similarities of Choice Models 
There is a communality of all the models mentioned above 
which goes beyond their relationship with the common focus, 
choice behavior. Some of these similarities are in their 
common philosophic assumptions, some in their similar ap­
proach to research. Without attempting a complete list or 
extensive discussion, some likenesses are suggested below 
which may help relate choice models to broader fields of 
knowledge. 
In all these models of choice, freedom of will is as­
sumed. The decision maker is influenced by his choice situa­
tion, but choice is not predetermined. If it were, there 
would be little interest in studying choice behavior since 
presumably it would be beyond anyone's power to influence. 
Another similarity is that these models all assume an 
interrelatedness of environmental elements. In choice analy­
sis quantities of commodities interact with each other and 
with price and income. Cultural elements influence goals 
and values and are influenced in turn. A basic meaning of 
the utility function is that, where several factors influence 
choice, they do so as an interacting unit. 
These models also take similar views of choice makers 
with regard to their individuality, assuming that choice 
makers are structurally alike with individualities in scale. 
This, again, is inherent in the utility function. 
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Interpersonal comparisons of utility are not possible because 
the utility scales of individuals differ, not because they do 
not experience utility derived from the same sources. Again, 
choice makers are assumed to choose with respect to common 
sets of values, although the scale on which they measure the 
relative importance of these goals and values in particular 
choice situations is not assumed to be identical for all. 
And, finally, each of these models takes a limited view 
of choice. A global model taking account of all aspects of 
choice is, perhaps, not impossible, but apparently it is 
deemed more expedient to base research on a model which en­
compasses only a part of the situation. In this way, specif­
ic questions about choice may be answered more efficiently 
than by using more comprehensive models, and at the same time 
information is provided which may contribute to analysis of 
the entire situation. 
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III. MODELS 
A model Is a device to bridge the gap between theory 
and real world. There may be many kinds of models, serving 
many purposes, but in their function as bridges they have 
common characteristics. 
A. Definition 
A model may be defined as an abstraction from a type of 
real situation. Concepts representing selected elements from 
the real situation are fitted into a system derived from 
theory. 
The point of interest in a model is the relationships 
among elements; therefore, elements should be identified in 
such a way as to exhibit those relationships most clearly. 
In a real situation it is usually difficult to perceive re­
lationships unless one has a preconception of what they will 
be, partly because of the brief period of time during which 
the event occurs, partly because of the presence of elements 
and relationships extraneous to those ones of interest. 
There are difficulties both in going from a real situa­
tion to a model and in going from a model to a real situa­
tion. In the first case the difficulty is that of construc­
ting, from one's impressions drawn from the real situation a 
coherent structure which will help one to understand certain 
aspects of the real situation. In the second case the 
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difficulty is in identifying elements of the model with one's 
impressions of the real situation in such a way that one may 
meaningfully describe the real situation in terms of the 
model. If, as may often be the case, one tries almost simul­
taneously to construct a model from sense impressions and 
apply it to the real situation, both difficulties are in­
volved. 
The observer who wishes to understand relationships 
which govern the internal logic of the situation must sort 
out those elements and relationships which make a coherent 
structure. He is like one who tries to put together a struc­
ture with pieces from an assortment such as an Erector set 
which can be used to make different structures. Sometimes 
his structure is incomplete because he has too few pieces; 
sometimes he has too many pieces and must select those which 
make the structure he has in mind. His perception may be in­
complete because of his inability to comprehend the entire 
situation in the brief space of time during which he may view 
it, or because he is unable to sort out the parts which be­
long to the model in which he is interested. He may have an 
inaccurate and incoherent model because parts from several 
models have been fitted together incorrectly. 
Suppose the observer is watching a machine cutting grass 
and trying to understand the mechanical principles which 
enable the machine to cut grass. Difficulty arises because 
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the machine is moving and there is no time to observe each 
part carefully, because he cannot see all parts of the 
machine at once and perhaps cannot ever see some parts. Fur­
ther, the machine may include parts whose movements are ran­
dom or at least irrelevant to the cutting operation. The ob­
server must identify elements from his confused impressions 
of lines, colors, shapes, and volumes and examine these ele­
ments for indications of relationships among them. If these 
elements unambiguously exhibit relations relevant to cutting, 
the observer can be satisfied with his perception of ele­
ments; if not he must reexamine his impressions and compose 
them into a different set of elements. The question is not 
whether elements are identified in the real situation; rather 
the question is which set of elements exhibit relationships 
with least ambiguity. 
To give an example in economic research, suppose the ob­
server is interested in money income and expenditures as re­
lated by transactions in the retail market. It may be easy 
to distinguish one individual person from another, but are 
individual persons the elements which will exhibit unambig­
uously income-expenditure relationships? Usually not, since 
one individual may spend only a small portion of the income he 
receives, another may receive only a small part of the income 
he spends, and many other individuals may have a considerable 
effect on income-expenditure relationships without ever re­
ceiving or spending any money at all. Family income and 
35 
expenditures may be more clearly related; therefore, it may 
be convenient to treat the family as an element in the 
income-expenditure situation, even though the family unit is 
more difficult to define than the single individual. 
To continue with the example, suppose that the observer 
wishes to identify an Engel-type relationship between income 
and food expenditures. Should one element be expenditures in 
grocery stores? Will this element exhibit the relationship 
unambiguously, or will the income-food relationship be con­
fused with relationships between income and expenditures for 
cleaning supplies, toiletries, and hardware? It is true, 
this is largely a difficulty in the operational definition of 
elements. On a more basic level, suppose the object of ob­
servation is to distinguish relationships between income and 
expenditures for necessities as opposed to luxuries. In this 
case, should expenditures for food be treated as a single 
element, or subdivided as food for parties, for company 
meals, for snacks, for family meals? Should beverages be in­
cluded? Should items such as coffee filters, which are con­
sumed in one using, be classified with expenditures on cof­
fee? Questions such as these arise both in constructing and 
applying models and must be resolved if the models are to be 
coherent. 
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B. Scientific and Personal Models 
A model for scientific analysis and prediction should 
meet more exacting requirements than models constructed and 
remembered to meet casual requirements of everyday living. 
Scientific models are included in the corpus of the various 
sciences; they are tools for the orderly enlargement and ver­
ification of knowledge. Personal models are part of the 
mental equipment of individuals and are transmitted from one 
person to another with little regard for exactness of dupli­
cation. 
A model expresses regularities. A scientific model ex­
presses measurable regularities. Irregular or nonmeasurable 
factors (nonmeasurable because difficult or incapable of 
measurement) must be omitted from scientific models. It is 
impossible to take many measurements simultaneously; there­
fore a model can take into account individually only a few 
factors, though sometimes many factors may be recognized in a 
single measurement as, for example, probability measures. 
Because individuals require less precision of measurement in 
applying personal models than scientific ones, it is possible 
for personal models to include many more factors. This some­
times may result in more accurate prediction from personal 
than scientific models, though the imprecision of measurement 
causes predictive performance from personal models to be 
erratic. 
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For example, suppose the economist is interested in the 
behavior of persons receiving windfall payments of $100 each. 
According to the scientific model which the economist wishes 
to test, consumers as an aggregate will spend a proportion 
k out of windfall income and save a proportion (l - k).^ 
Suppose one of the windfall payments goes to the economist's 
next door neighbor. From his personal knowledge of his 
neighbor, the economist may predict correctly that this man 
will spend a proportion q of his windfall income. Or perhaps 
the economist, while accepting the aggregate model C = kYw, 
i.e., consumption equals a proportion k of windfall income, 
may predict that behavior with respect to windfall income 
coming at a particular time or to a particular group of con­
sumers will not conform to the model, due to special circum­
stances of which he is aware but which are not included in 
the model. Again the economist's personal model might be a 
better predictor than the scientific one. 
In many situations the advantages of scientific models 
outweigh the added cost of taking precise measurements and 
the disadvantage that the personal model may sometimes be a 
better predictor. One advantage of the scientific model may 
be that its predictive performance, in repeated applications 
1Ronald Bodkin. Windfall income and consumption. Amer­
ican Economic Review 49: 602-6l4. 1959. p. 603. 
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to a variety of situations, may be better than that of the 
personal model. Moreover, the scientific model may be 
applied without loss of predictive precision to situations 
about which so little is known that the personal model might 
be a poor predictor. Also, the formulation and application 
of personal models usually involve a certain amount of 
"flare" or intuition; the scientific model may be used with 
success by any trained technician. But perhaps the most im­
portant advantage of the scientific model over the personal 
is that it gives a standard performance; therefore, the error 
of prediction may be estimated. 
Whether the advantages of the scientific model outweigh 
the disadvantages in application to any specific situation is 
a matter for judgment in each individual case. Often no 
known scientific model is applicable to a situation and so 
personal models must be used. Many personal models are in­
exact replicas of scientific ones, and may be applied in 
situations in which the scientific model is too costly or 
seems likely to be a poor predictor. 
The distinctions between scientific and personal models 
may be discussed under three headings, consistency, trad­
missibility, and manner of application to real situations. 
There may be other distinctions, but these three will illus­
trate important points of difference. 
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1. Consistency 
Consistency is the congruity of parts, that is, corre­
sponding relationships must be the same and no contradictions 
may exist. Consistency in a model is desirable for two 
reasons: (a) a belief that no inconsistency is possible in 
the real world, and (b) the difficulty of knowing which of a 
set of mutually inconsistent models or relationships applies 
in a real situation. 
Models may be consistent internally and externally. If 
a model is internally consistent, necessary conclusions drawn 
from any part of the model must not contradict necessary con­
clusions drawn from any other part or from the whole model. 
As a simple example, consider a model which states that sav­
ings is a function of interest rate and consumption is a 
function of income. If savings is defined as income minus 
consumption expenditures, then the model is internally in­
consistent, since if consumption changes in response to a 
change in income, then savings must change regardless of the 
interest rate. A model is externally consistent if no nec­
essary conclusion drawn from the model or any part of the 
model contradicts necessary conclusions drawn from other 
models held to be true. 
Consistency, both internal and external, is a desirable 
property for a model to have. A minimum requirement for a 
scientific model is that it be internally consistent. This 
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is difficult to attain; it takes time and careful thought to 
explore critically all the implications of any statement. 
Perfect external consistency is probably humanly impossible 
of attainment, but nevertheless limited external consistency 
is the aim of any science; consistency, that is, limited to 
the models accepted as a part of that science. 
Personal models frequently are inconsistent, both in­
ternally and externally. Individuals allow inconsistencies 
in their sets of personal models because of the trouble or 
impossibility of correcting inconsistencies where the dis­
advantage may be small compared with the difficulty of at­
taining consistency, and because of the ease of handling in­
consistencies in real situations. The latter is true because 
in applications of personal models individuals take many 
factors into consideration which could not be admitted in the 
application of scientific models. 
2. Transmisslbility 
The criterion of transmissibility refers to the pre­
cision with which a model is stated. If a model is stated 
precisely, it can be transmitted with reasonable care from 
one person to another and from one time to another without 
alteration of meaning. Precision of definition and measure­
ment is a distinguishing characteristic of scientific models. 
By precision is meant exact reproducibility. All terms in a 
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scientific model should be unambiguously defined so that all 
persons reasonably familiar with the language in which the 
model is stated understand the terms in the model to refer to 
the same objects in the real world and can reproduce exactly 
measurements of those objects. In scientific application, 
exact reproducibility is more important than exact corre­
spondence to real situations. 
Individuals usually do not trouble themselves to trans­
mit their personal models exactly or to measure elements 
precisely. 
3. Manner of application to real situations 
The third criterion distinguishing scientific from 
personal models has to do with application to real situa­
tions. In scientific models this is governed by rules which 
are a part of the model itself or which are generally ac­
cepted within the science as governing the application of 
models. The application of personal models are governed by 
no rules save those which the individual considers it reason­
able or expedient to follow in any particular situation. 
One type of rule with respect to application of scien­
tific models is the prescription of a set of conditions to be 
met in order for the model to predict the outcome of any 
particular situation. These may also be called the assump­
tions of the model. As an example, consider the ceteris 
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paribus assumption governing application' of the economic 
model describing supply and demand, or assumptions about 
market structure included in the same model.1 
Another type of rule governing the application of scien­
tific models is that which prescribes manner of identifying 
and measuring elements in the real situation. Still another 
type governs the interpretation of evidence gathered by ob­
servation and measurement. This includes rules regarding 
the interpretation of observed inconsistencies, the degree of 
confirmation required for belief in conclusions reached 
through application of the model, or manner of arriving at 
and expressing predictions or generalizations about the ob­
served situation. 
C. Formulation of Problems 
An important application of models to real situations is 
in the formulation of problems. Although the solution to a 
problem may be sought in data from the real world, the state­
ment of the problem is necessarily drawn from a model since 
it is itself an abstraction. The model used in the statement 
of the problem may be a personal one or, in scientific re­
search especially, a scientific one. 
The extensive statement of a problem and solution must 
^Boulding, op. cit., pp. 63-79• 
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include an indication of admissible factors (elements and 
relationships), specification of what constitutes an accept­
able solution, and the decision rule for arriving at a solu­
tion. Of the many factors present in a decision situation, 
only a few can be admitted into the statement of the problem. 
This is because a problem containing many factors is diffi­
cult to manage, and also because many factors in the situa­
tion are extraneous to the desired solution, that is, they 
either have no effect on the solution, or their inclusion 
would cause an unacceptable conclusion to be reached. There­
fore the statement of the problem must indicate admissible 
factors, either by itemizing admissible elements or by speci­
fying criteria for admission. Closely allied to this is the 
necessity for describing the solution which will be accept­
able. To give a simple example from mathematics, suppose the 
problem is 
O 
The decision rule describes the manipulations to be performed 
E(X2) = ? 
and admissible factors are 
Y = f(X), 0 ^  X ^  1. 
The acceptable solution is defined by 
where 
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in order to reach the specified solution. 
Rules for obtaining a solution may not be unique; in any 
particular problem there may be several decision rules which 
will give acceptable solutions. Nor are these solutions nec­
essarily identical. For example, consider the payoff matrix 
for a two-person zero sum game. The admissible factors are 
summed up in the matrix; the solution which is acceptable is 
that choice yielding the highest payoff under given assump­
tions about the opponent's choice. Several decision rules 
have been proposed for identifying this alternative, the max-
imin rule, pessimism-optimism index, and the minimum regret 
rule, for example.1 These rules do not necessarily give 
identical solutions, though they are all rules for obtaining 
solutions. 
In some cases no decision rule may be known which gives 
a solution identified as acceptable. It may be possible, 
however, to redefine the problem in such a way that a de­
cision rule can be formulated. 
Since consumer choice is based on preference, choice 
problems must take account of both preference and physical 
relationships. Analysis may proceed in one of two ways: 
(a) preference relationships may be transformed into physical 
1R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. Games and decisions. 
New York, N. Y., John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1957. PP. 278-
286. 
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ones in the statement of the problem, and the rules for solu­
tion given in physical terms; or (b) physical relationships 
may be transformed into preference ones, and the manipula­
tions be expressed in preference terms. Consider the follow­
ing simple model: with respect to houses, satisfaction varies 
directly with amount of floor space. Problem: choose the 
house yielding the most satisfaction per dollar. Solution: 
house having the highest ratio of measured floor space to 
purchase price. In the solution all preference relationships 
have been transformed into a single relationship between two 
physical characteristics. 
This type of model is not always so simple. For exam­
ple, indifference curve analysis is a transformation of pref­
erences for bundles of goods into a form in which choice can 
be made on the basis of physical characteristics alone. Bun­
dles of goods are arranged in order of physical quantity; the 
indifference curve identifies'each set of bundles indiffer­
ently preferred; this is the statement of the problem. The 
solution is given in terms of physical quantities of goods 
and their money cost. 
In contrast with indifference curve analysis, marginal 
utility analysis states the problem by transforming physical 
units of goods into preference units and then expressing the 
solution in terms of operations on the preference units. 
Physical units, i.e., dollars' worth of goods, are transformed 
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into quantities of utility, then the solution is that bundle 
of goods which has the characteristic that marginal quanti­
ties of utility are equal. 
Indifference curve analysis has seemed an improvement 
over marginal utility analysis because it has seemed to in­
volve less dependence on preference relations and consequent­
ly less need for manipulating intangibles. 
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENT OF CHOICE 
Choice takes place in an environment in which the de­
cision maker, his attitudes, aptitudes and predispositions 
for action have a key position. Also included are the de­
cision maker's surroundings, both tangible and intangible, 
animate and inanimate. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine environment in a general way as a preliminary to the 
analysis of choice. 
A. The Decision Maker 
The individual person1 exists as part of an environment 
in which he is in continuing contact with sense data, i.e., 
impressions of his own bodily processes as well as of ob­
jects external to his body. He may be regarded as organiz­
ing his sense data, ordering them by preference, forming and 
conforming to patterns. All of this is involved in percep­
tion and is the basis for overt behavior, that is, acts that 
can be observed. Just as perceptions are structured sense 
^The decision maker might not be a single person, but a 
family or other group deciding something together. This 
makes no difference with respect to theory of choice, which 
is confined in this analysis to the logic of applying pref­
erence as a criterion for choosing among alternatives. Here­
after the decision maker will be spoken of as a single per­
son; no account will be taken of possible interaction among 
individuals in reaching a decision. 
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data, activities are structures of overt acts performed by 
the decision maker. 
In the present study, the behavior of interest is con­
sumption and the perceptions and activities related to it. 
Choice is the selection from among several forms of consump­
tion and related acts. For example, the activity of food 
consumption may be defined as including purchase, storage 
and preparation of food as well as food service, eating, and 
the cleaning and storage of utensils. As defined here, con­
sumption excludes choices in which the implications of using 
up are not significant. 
1. Ferceiver 
The individual learns to sense clusters of data which he 
reacts to as wholes. Once the cluster is organized, he may 
no longer perceive the entire array, but only one or two of 
the most salient data, which then serve as cues for behavior. 
Other data are sensed, particularly when the individual is in 
a situation with some elements of novelty, but some part of 
the mind constantly seeks to identify learned behavioral cues. 
2. Pattern maker 
As sense data are structured, corresponding patterns of 
behavior are learned. These are activity sequences, each 
oriented toward some cluster of sense data and intended to 
obtain desired outcomes. The effectiveness of activities in 
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obtaining these objectives depends on (a) skill in perceiving 
as cues the appropriate data from the environment, (b) skill 
in recognizing suitable means, including tools, for obtaining 
the desired outcome, (c) ability to control such tools for 
present and anticipated use, (d) possession of a repertoire 
of effective behaviors, and (e) skill in selecting effective 
behaviors. 
Selection of effective behaviors to obtain desired out­
comes is the heart of choice theory. The decision maker must 
perceive the desired outcome and alternatives within his con­
trol which will effect that outcome. His problem is to se­
lect an alternative which will achieve the desired outcome to 
the highest attainable degree or with the greatest likelihood 
of success. 
Choice is possible because sense data can be perceived 
as patterns. The decision maker learns to anticipate por­
tions of the pattern and control it, for example, by antici­
pating hunger and providing food to satisfy it. He may also 
select among variations of a pattern and act in such a way 
that the desired variant is likely to be realized. Since the 
actions he perceives as possible may be ineffective or the 
pattern unpredictable in his information state, he is seldom 
certain of attaining his objective. 
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3. Ordering agent 
The decision maker does not merely perceive his situa­
tion; he perceives himself in relation to his situation and 
orders elements according to his preferences. Order is a 
structure superimposed on perceptions, with the ordering of 
particular elements partly dependent on their position in the 
pattern. For example, the acquisition of savings may be per­
ceived as an essential part of a pattern leading to some out­
come having a high preference order; savings, then, would 
also tend to be valued highly. 
Value- standards are the basis for preference. These are 
ideal relationships or benchmarks which the decision maker 
contrasts with perceived relations in order to identify his 
preferences with real elements. 
Preference ordering of elements is dependent on three 
factors : real environmental relationships, perception, and 
value standards. The decision maker senses data, perceives 
in them cues which indicate a pattern which he recognizes, and 
orders according to his preference the alternative outcomes 
associated with that pattern. 
B. Activity Patterns 
A part of the environment of choice are the activity 
patterns in which choices are realized. It is in this re­
lationship that consumption is evaluated by the decision 
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maker. An activity pattern is a set of activities having in 
common their relationship to a single decision maker and also 
some other relationship such as contiguity in time or space, 
identity of objectives, or similarities in the actions per­
formed. At intervals in the pattern there occur points at 
which variations might be effected. Decisions are made at 
these points, either in advance or as they become necessary. 
To the observer activity patterns provide a means for 
classifying decision makers; for example, as tennis players 
or as blue collar workers. This classification has two ad­
vantages; (a) it is relatively easy to observe certain evi­
dences of activity patterns; and (b) in their mediate posi­
tion between the decision maker and consumption, activity 
patterns provide an indirect means of observing and measuring 
preferences. For example, suppose the observer was inter­
ested in consumer decisions to purchase automobiles. One 
classification of decision makers might be by occupation, 
since automobiles are used more extensively in some occupa­
tions than others and are valued accordingly. 
Activity patterns have the following characteristics 
which make them a suitable basis for classifying consumers : 
regularity, duration and change, location in time and space, 
and differing levels of elaboration. These will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
52 
1. Regularity, duration, and change 
Classification is based on similarities and differences. 
The degree of regularity in an activity pattern is one basis 
for comparison. Regularity refers to similarities in inter­
vals at which an element recurs in the pattern, frequency with 
which two or more elements are associated as they recur, and 
proportion of such regular recurrences and associations in 
the total pattern. For example, one consumer may use a tooth 
brush at regular intervals and always with the same brand of 
tooth paste; a second consumer may brush at less regular in­
tervals and vary his brand of tooth paste. 
Another basis for comparing activities is in their dura­
tion. Some acts, as for example the tooth brushing one, may 
recur during most of the decision maker's lifetime. Other 
acts may recur over a short time and then be abandoned, as, 
for example, attending public dances. 
The degree of change to which an activity is liable is a 
third basis for comparison. For example, during any single 
period of time, patterns of food consumption usually do not 
change greatly, while during the same period patterns in 
recreational activity may undergo substantial change. A con­
sumer is less likely to change from three meals a day to one 
than to change from three movies a week to one. 
Regularity, duration, and degree of change of activity 
patterns have certain implications in choice analysis. They 
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affect the frequency of decisions and the kinds of decisions 
which are made. They also may create a predisposition on the 
part of the decision maker to choose certain kinds of alterna­
tives . 
2. Location in time and space 
Another aspect of activity patterns worth examining is 
their location in time and space. Some regularities in pat­
terns are contiguities of elements in time or space. 
Activities may be subsidiary to other activities in the 
sense that one always precedes or follows the other in time. 
Other activities tend to be separated in time. Such con­
siderations affect the way the decision maker defines al­
ternatives; for example, two alternatives may be identified 
as one because of their time relationship. 
The decision maker may allocate much of his effort and 
resources to procuring the use of appropriate activity space 
at convenient times and in making commodities and services 
available. Parks and picnic areas, public streets, and 
private homes, all are examples of space provided and 
equipped to facilitate particular kinds of activities. 
Regularity in activity patterns may be partly explained 
by the considerable organization necessary to bring into con­
junction, at appropriate time periods and in appropriate 
spaces, the persons and physical objects for carrying out 
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activities. A regular routine conserves resources which 
would otherwise be consumed in the process of making deci­
sions. Consumers may prefer to adapt their activities to 
established patterns rather than create new ones. 
3. Elaboration of activities 
Choice takes place within the setting of an activity 
pattern which partially fixes the conditions for choice mak­
ing and provides a terminology by which the chosen alterna­
tive may be compactly described. What has gone on before in 
the pattern decides the alternative ways the pattern can be 
continued, expanded, terminated, or changed. These alterna­
tives may be described in their relationship to the pattern. 
Therefore, a knowledge of the pattern is pertinent to the 
analysis of individual choice behavior. It is a partial 
summary of the physical environment of choice. 
Suppose consumption is associated with a small number of 
basic activities such as eating, ensuring health and sanita­
tion, recreation, rest and sleep. The activities may be 
carried on at what might be termed a minimum level or may be 
expanded and elaborated to any degree, for example, by 
1. increasing the proportion of time given to that 
activity; 
2. increasing the regularity of its performance, or the 
priority it is given over other activities; 
3. elaborating the materials used in the activity by 
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increasing the proportion having specialized functions, re­
fining their design, or establishing exclusive rights to 
materials; 
4. increasing the number, specialized function, and 
refinement of the separate acts included in the activity; 
5. establishing and elaborating rituals; 
6. including within the activity action units having a 
purpose subsidiary to the main purpose of the activity; 
7. increasing the number of persons participating in 
the activity; the specialization of their roles, and the de­
gree to which their performance follows a pre-established 
pattern; and 
8. attaching to the activity specialized symbols, 
language, literature. 
Using this approach, variations of activities could be 
classified or ranked on a continuum according to their level 
of elaboration. Consumers might be categorized according to 
elaboration of activities. Also alternatives might be de­
fined as different forms or levels of elaboration. 
C. Planes of Living 
An alternative method of summarizing the choice environ­
ment is in terms of planes of living, a method which has the 
advantage that the consumer's activities are summarized as an 
interacting whole rather than as several distinct parts. The 
plane of living may be defined as the pattern of all 
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activities carried on by a decision maker. It is a complete 
description of the choice environment. Moreover, variations 
of planes may be ordered, either by their physical charac­
teristics or by preference. 
1. Physical measurement of planes 
Suppose it were possible to describe in quantitative 
terms the degree to which any activity is expanded and elab­
orated; then the whole activity of a consuming unit could be 
described and quantified as plane of living. This would in­
clude all activities engaged in by the consuming unit, al­
though the ones of particular interest here are consuming 
activities and their concomitants. A complete description 
of plane of living would identify all the separate acts in 
each activity, the persons and material objects associated 
with each, and time and space allotments. 
There would be very large numbers of possible planes of 
living so described, probably at least as many as there are 
consuming units. If, however, as may be hypothesized, planes 
of living tend to be similar and to be expanded in similar 
ways within a culture, it is reasonable to categorize them, 
either into groups or along a continuum. Descriptions could 
then be simplified to a bare indication of group membership 
or position on the continuum. This might be indicated by the 
mention of one or more salient characteristics of the plane, 
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2. Preferences for planes 
The practice of indicating an entire plane of living with 
a brief descriptive term facilitates communication, but it 
has two additional effects of some importance. It enables 
an individual to identify his own plane of living with some 
group or position on the continuum and to define planes of 
living he would like to attain. It may also give an exag­
gerated importance to certain features due to a general recog­
nition of them as characteristic of certain planes of living. 
To elaborate, the ability to treat a plane of living as 
a unit, even though by a mere verbal trick, makes it possible 
for individuals to develop and express preferences for entire 
planes. Preferences may be due to presence of preferred 
characteristics, or, on the other hand, characteristics may 
be preferred because they are contained in preferred planes. 
Verbal description of planes of living as units indi­
cates and intensifies the interrelatedness of the character­
istics of a plane of living. These may be interrelated be­
cause the time and space each activity occupies must be 
scheduled in competition with requirements of other activi­
ties and because material appurtenances are generally in 
short supply and can be obtained only by allocating resources 
among competing uses. Another reason may be the psychological 
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conviction that, since certain characteristics are treated as 
a unit verbally, they must necessarily appear together in 
real life. 
The characteristics chosen to serve as indicators of 
plane of living for the purpose of communication are usually 
the most conspicuous features or sometimes the most integral. 
For example, wall-to-wall carpeting or country club member­
ship are convenient tags because these things are highly 
visible. Conspicuous might also mean most satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory, for example, planes of living classified by 
presence or absence of running water or by the amount of paid 
household help. Some characteristics serve to indicate plane 
of living because they are an integral part of many activi­
ties, for example, income or type of residence. 
One's preferences with respect to planes of living are 
intimately associated with the satisfactions yielded by dif­
ferent planes. Satisfaction stems from the fulfillment of 
expectations, completion of plans, execution of decisions, 
from a consciousness of respect and envy on the part of 
others, from reduction of physical discomfort, and from 
aesthetic appreciations. Probably satisfactions are asso­
ciated with activity units rather than with the plane of liv­
ing as a whole. However, an entire plane of living may be 
accepted and desired because of certain highly desirable and 
integral parts. For this reason, certain characteristics of 
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a plane of living may be highly valued even though the satis­
faction derived from them is slight, while characteristics 
satisfactory in themselves may receive a low valuation be­
cause of disagreeable concomitants. 
Plane of living is a concept which summarizes a complex 
array of real elements. The shorthand techniques which en­
able discussion of planes of living as integrated wholes also 
affect decisions by further integrating the components of 
planes and by affecting valuation of components. 
As shorthand designations such as country club member­
ship are incomplete descriptions, they may frequently be mis­
leading. However, human behavior is based on imprecise 
designations and effects of this should be taken into con­
sideration in a theory of behavior. The task is complicated 
by the fact that human beings are generally well aware that 
their language is imprecise and make corrections for this. 
The corrections themselves are not always consistent or well 
advised. In the case of plane of living, shorthand designa­
tions, corrected or not, influence valuation and therefore 
choice. 
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D. Decision and Choice 
In professional literature a distinction is seldom made 
between decision and choice. Siegel1 uses "model of choice" 
to describe a construct combining utility as a basis for 
choice with psychological factors which affect the decision 
process, but in the same context he also speaks of decision 
making. Davidson and Suppes2 use the term "decision making" 
to describe their model, while Luce^ speaks of choice. Moore 
and Anderson^ use the term problem solving in the same sense 
as decision. There seems to be no consensus on a distinction 
between the theory of choice and the theory of decision. 
Thus, each author bears responsibility for defining and jus­
tifying the terms he does use. 
1. Definitions 
A distinction between decision and choice is feasible 
with respect to their scope and dynamic aspects. In the 
1Sidney Siegel. Theoretical models of choice and strat­
egy behavior: stable state behavior in the two-choice uncer­
tain outcome situation. Psychometrika 24: 303-316. 1959. 
^Davidson and Suppes. op_. cit. 
3r. Duncan Luce. Individual choice behavior. New York, 
N. Y., John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1959. 
4q. K. Moore and S. B. Anderson. Search behavior in 
individual and group problem solving. American Sociological 
Review 19: 702-714. 1955. 
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chapters which follow, decision will be taken to mean an 
entire process, including identification of objectives and 
alternatives, gathering and evaluating information, and se­
lecting a single alternative. Choice is only one step in the 
decision process, that of selecting one alternative from a 
set of two or more alternatives. Action follows, but is not 
included in, choice. Decision is a dynamic concept, choice 
is static. Every step in the decision process is somehow re­
lated to choice; therefore, the analysis of choice yields a 
static picture of decision viewed at the moment of choice. 
Choice might be viewed simply as behavior, without norm­
ative implications. In contrast, studies dealing with the 
logic of choice seek to identify the characteristics of the 
optimum, that is, the alternative which the decision maker 
really wants or ought to choose. Having defined optimum 
choice, these studies may proceed either to compare the char­
acteristics of the optimum choice with those of the actual 
choice, or to identify and measure the characteristics of the 
actual choice defined arbitrarily as the optimum. 
2. Elements and relationships in choice 
The logical nature of choice has been explained in many 
ways, but these models necessarily cover two facets of the 
choice situation. First, the elements in each alternative 
possesses certain causal or associational relationships with 
the physical outcome of choice, and second, each alternative 
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possesses causal or assoclatlonal relationships with the 
psychological or sociological outcome. To illustrate this, 
suppose a family is choosing a home from among several houses 
on the market. Each house possesses physical characteristics, 
that is, each has particular outside dimensions, number and 
shape of rooms, kind and quality of materials, location with 
respect to other residences, schools, shopping areas, the 
breadwinner's job. Each house has its own terms of sale, in­
cluding amounts and timing of money payments. These charac­
teristics bring into being physical relationships, such as 
the amount of money to be spent for housing in relation to 
total income and to other expenditures, contiguity to other 
persons resident in the neighborhood, lines of travel to bus­
iness establishments, school, and friends. These physical 
relationships produce different physical outcomes, depending 
on which house is chosen. If one house is purchased, the 
family may follow one pattern of time and money use, have one 
set of friends, engage in one set of activities; if another 
is chosen, these may be quite different. But physical rela­
tions alone are not a sufficient basis for choice; there must 
in addition be preference relationships. 
"Physical" has, perhaps, been used in a peculiar sense. 
By it is meant that which can be observed or inferred direct­
ly from evidence other than introspection. Preference refers 
W 
to emotional content. Physical relationships may or may not 
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be directly measurable. Preference can only be measured by 
introspection or by indirection, that is, by measuring physi­
cal factors closely associated with preference. Where it 
seems necessary to take preference into account it is im­
portant to select with care the physical relations assumed to 
exhibit the effects of preference. The first requisite is 
that these physical relations be unambiguously defined, both 
in themselves and as carriers of preference relationships. 
The second is that they be conveniently and exactly measur­
able. The third requisite is that these physical relations 
be good predictors in a model where they are included as 
measures of preference. 
Physical relationships are relatively easy t.o define, 
while preference relationships may be extremely difficult to 
identify and manipulate in a model. To give an example, 
chemists and physicists have taken considerable trouble to 
remove psychological content from their disciplines. Their 
success in building a body of knowledge has been due in large 
part to their accomplishment of the statement of problems and 
solutions in physical terms. But scientists concerned with 
conscious human behavior cannot purge their data of psycholog­
ical intent without sometimes distorting the significance of 
physical relationships. The best they can do is define 
problems in such a way that observable physical relations 
embody definable preference relationships. As an example, 
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consider mathematical learning theory, in which experiments 
are set up in such a way that overt behavior gives informa­
tion by inference about learning relationships.1 
3. Statement of the choice problem 
Choice might be approached from several points of view; 
the one chosen for this dissertation is analytic. This means 
that each alternative presented to the decision maker may be 
resolved into elements or characteristics which can be meas­
ured both in physical units and in terms of preference, and 
that some function of these elements measured in physical 
units is capable of discriminating between those alternatives 
which the decision maker is likely to reject and those which 
he will accept if feasible. The discriminate function is 
presumed to reflect in some manner the decision maker's pref­
erences with respect to elements of alternatives and the de­
cision rule which he applies. 
The present study was undertaken to construct a model of 
choice such that discriminate functions which are good pre­
dictors may be fitted from data, and inferences drawn con­
cerning preferences and decision rules. 
1r. R. Bush and ¥. K. Estes, eds. Studies in mathemati­
cal learning theory. Stanford, California, Stanford Univer­
sity Press. 1959. 
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V. ELEMENTS OF CHOICE 
One way to analyze choice is in terms of elements and 
relationships among them. An element is described by the in­
clusion relationship; it is an entity belonging to a class 
having certain specified properties. To be part of the 
choice situation, an element must be present in or bear some 
relation to each alternative, directly or indirectly. To 
have an effect on choice, the degree in which an element is 
present in or related to alternatives must vary. 
The same situation can be defined using alternative sets 
of elements. For example, in an area survey one might take 
as elements houses, blocks, groups of blocks, or entire 
cities. Expenditures could be divided into elements by con­
sumption categories as food, clothing, housing; by type of 
store where expenditures were made as grocery, hardware, de­
partment store; by manner of payment as cash, credit, or 
barter; by the person benefiting by the expenditure; by dur­
ability of goods purchased; or by other criteria which could 
be devised. 
Clearly, the real situation is not affected by the 
choice of elements used to describe it, but the ease of anal­
ysis and even the decision maker's choice among alternatives 
may be. This is because different sets of relationships be­
come apparent depending on the classification used to identi­
fy elements. These relationships do not cease to exist when 
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the situation is described in elements which do not exhibit 
them. They are an integral part of the alternatives, ready 
to work out their physical effects when an alternative is 
acted upon. 
A set of elements may cover the entire decision situa­
tion or only part of it. An analysis of a decision might in­
clude several sets of elements, each completely covering the 
situation. For example, the family planning its expenditures 
might classify them by consumption categories, by manner of 
payment, by person benefited and by person making the expend­
iture. 
Measurements of all kinds might be elements as, for ex­
ample, number, weight, space, volume, direction, intensity of 
colcr or of sound, location in time, quantity of time, prob­
ability of occurrence, shape, color. Relations which are not 
measured in cardinal units might be elements as well, for ex­
ample, tonal quality, artistry, emotional content. A mani­
festation, that is, something which either is or is not pres­
ent, might be an element. 
A relationship is an association of several elements. , 
Relations may be treated as elements in one part of the anal­
ysis and as relations in another. An element might be a sin­
gle thing or several things in conjunction. For example, 
weight might be an element and volume another; the relation­
ship between weight and volume might be a part of the 
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analysis. But volume is itself the relationship of other 
measures, for example, length, width, and height, which might 
also be taken as elements in the analysis. 
The following are proposed as significant elements of 
the decision situation: objectives, alternatives, and char­
acteristics. Each of these is an entire set of elements; 
together they describe the decision maker's perception of the 
decision situation. The problem and its solution can be ex­
pressed in those terms. 
A. Objectives 
Objectives are goals or purposes which the decision 
maker wishes to have accomplished by his choice. Alterna­
tives are defined in relation to objectives held by the de­
cision maker. 
Objectives may be defined narrowly or broadly; that is, 
one's objective might be to obtain a mower for cutting grass, 
to keep one's lawn beautiful, to keep up the value of one's 
property, to maintain one's status in the neighborhood, or 
all of these things defined in some comprehensive statement. 
1. Definition of objectives 
The complete statement of an objective would include an 
indication of sensory outcome and level of elaboration of 
some activity pattern. The sensory outcome might be the 
satisfaction of hunger, the preservation or enhancement of a 
feeling of security, the satisfaction of a desire for com­
panionship, or the desire to relieve pain. Categories may 
differ; there is no need here to make a definitive or com­
prehensive list. 
Activity patterns may be described by the persons and 
material objects involved and space and time requirements ; 
therefore, objectives might be defined in the same way. 
Persons involved are those whose needs will be gratified 
or frustrated by the fulfillment of the objective as well as 
those whose existence or actions facilitate or hinder the 
fulfillment. For example, suppose the decision maker is con­
sidering the purchase of a lawn mower. He thinks of himself, 
as the person who will use the lawn mower, and of his pref­
erences for efficiency and convenience in the grass cutting 
operation of a lawn mower, its propulsion requirements, 
storage and upkeep requirements. He considers the prefer­
ences of himself and his family for a trimmed lawn. He con­
siders his neighbors, both with respect to keeping the lawn 
in such condition that it will not detract from the appear­
ance of the neighborhood and with respect to their needs and 
rights to quiet on a Sunday morning when he may want to cut 
his grass. He may also consider his neighbors with a view 
to keeping abreast of them in possession of gadgetry. He 
considers the persons with whom he will deal in purchasing 
and maintaining the lawn mowers from among which he is 
choosing. These persons may differ with respect to their 
reliability, their willingness to oblige, their skill, their 
pleasantness. He may consider others who will share the use 
of the lawn mower. 
Objectives are defined with respect to material objects 
and space. The decision maker above considers lawn mowers in 
relation to the size of his lawn, its contours, the shrubs, 
trees and other plants on it, and also sidewalks, walls, lawn 
furniture, and other objects on the lawn. He considers the 
variety of grass and other growth on the lawn, other equip­
ment he has for lawn care, and storage space. 
These material objects are related to the objective 
either as they are part of it, as they enable the decision 
maker to obtain other material objects which are part of the 
objective, or as they, facilitate or hinder actions which con­
tribute to the objective. Objects may be possessed by the 
decision maker or not; they may or may not be within his 
control, and the control may be complete or partial. Con­
siderations such as these affect the relation of material ob­
jects to the objective. 
Finally, objectives are defined with respect to time. 
Some period of time is defined as appropriate for fulfillment 
of the objective; fulfillment at another time is irrelevant 
or may even be undesirable. Some objectives might be appro­
priately fulfilled at any time, others not. 
Like the objective, the activities associated with the 
alternatives considered by the decision maker are dated. 
Their dating depends on the time period considered appro­
priate for the fulfillment of the objective; however, the . 
activities need not take place in the same period during 
which the objective is fulfilled. Suppose the decision maker 
decides to write a letter inviting a friend to visit him. He 
must decide on a time to write the letter, and he may specify 
in his letter the time appropriate for the friend's visit, 
but he might also indicate that any future time would be 
appropriate, so that the fulfillment of the objective, that 
is, the visit, might occur any time. 
Objectives are defined not only with respect to point of 
time for their fulfillment but also period of time during 
which fulfillment is to endure, and regularity of occurrence 
of fulfillment, if this is to come at different points of 
time. Location in time may be defined by time measures 
alone, or in relation to other objectives or extraneous 
events, for example, ones which permit the objective to be 
fulfilled. 
Objectives differ with respect to the clarity and pre­
cision with which elements are defined. The decision maker 
may have one objective so clearly in mind that he can say 
exactly with which of his psychological needs it is identi­
fied, what persons, material objects and spaces will be 
involved, and what time periods will be allocated for the 
accomplishment of the objective. But other objectives held 
by the decision maker may be defined imprecisely in any or 
all of these respects. An objective need not be defined 
precisely to be the motivation of choice; indeed, it may not 
be possible to define any objective with perfect precision. 
But the precision with which the objective is defined may 
affect the decision maker's choice, and so must be taken into 
consideration in the analysis of choice. 
Objectives differ also with respect to the precision 
with which fulfillment is defined. After the chosen alterna­
tive is acted upon, the decision maker evaluates its success 
in accomplishing his objective. This evaluation may take the 
form of a list of precisely defined conditions to be met, 
with success the realization of all these conditions, or 
evaluation may be a vague introspection into the decision 
maker's emotional state with success defined imprecisely or 
not at all. Successful fulfillment may be defined before the 
decision is made or not until some later time. It may be 
identified with emotions, condition of material objects and 
space, persons, or time; or it may be defined in all these 
terms. 
Success with respect to time may have to do with (a) the 
point in time when the objective is realized, either measured 
in time units or in relation to other events]'(b) the period 
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of time during which fulfillment endures; (c) promptness; 
or (d) regularity. Successful fulfillment with respect to 
persons may be defined as their having completed certain 
actions or their indicating certain emotional states. 
A distinction may be made between conceptual and opera­
tional precision of objectives. An objective is conceptually 
precise if the decision maker has clearly in mind, as dis­
cussed above, the state or condition he would like to see 
obtain. The desired condition will be defined in general 
terms, however, with many details left to chance or later 
consideration. An objective is operationally precise if it 
is defined in such a way that it can serve as a guide for 
action. 
For example, suppose the objective is to serve a com­
pany meal. This objective might be amplified to gain con­
ceptual precision by further specifying that the meal is to 
be served to a small congenial group of friends, that it must 
be inexpensive and easy to prepare, that the table service 
must be attractive and convenient, and that the food itself 
must be tasty and have a variety of textures, colors, tem­
peratures and forms. Stated in this way, the objective 
serves as a guide for decisions about the meal. Once these 
decisions have been made, the objective can be redefined in 
operationally precise terms : list of guests, menu, serving 
dishes, times .to begin preparation of foods. An objective 
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is made conceptually precise to serve as a basis for de­
cision. It is made operationally precise to serve as a basis 
for action. 
Decisions are often made in stages. Beginning with a 
general objective, such as that of entertaining friends, de­
cisions are made which redefine the objective in operation­
ally meaningful terms, such as a menu, guest list, plan of 
work. The objectives finally arrived at in this narrowing 
process are expressed in terms of objects, time, and manipu­
lations . 
Another respect in which objectives differ is in the 
overtness with which they are acknowledged. This is related 
to but not identical with precision. Some objectives are 
overtly acknowledged by the decision maker, both to others 
and to himself; other objectives which are held by the de­
cision maker and which serve as the basis for decision may be 
only partially acknowledged or even denied. Objectives are 
expressed in preference orderings, however, whether the ob­
jectives are overtly or covertly held. If preference order­
ings are truly and honestly reported, they give a basis for 
reconstructing objectives. 
2. Relationships among objectives 
Objectives are interrelated, not only in level of defi­
nition as discussed above, but also in intensity and in 
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complementarity and substitution relationships. 
Intensity is exhibited in the decision maker's prefer­
ences among objectives. If it were possible to include all 
objectives in a set of mutually exclusive elements, then the 
decision maker should be able to order these objectives ac­
cording to how strongly he desires their fulfillment in the 
current time period. The condition of mutual exclusiveness 
is a necessary one, however. If the objectives are not so 
stated, that is, if all objectives are not on the same level 
with respect to operational precision, then the intensity of 
the decision maker's feelings about one objective may enter 
into his ordering of other objectives. For example, suppose 
the set to be ordered contains the objectives of entertaining 
friends graciously and serving an appetizing meal. Since the 
second objective may be a part of the first at a different 
level of operational precision, the decision maker cannot 
reasonably distinguish between them to the extent that he 
wants one more than another. Suppose the set is enlarged to 
include a third objective, participating in the conversation 
in such a way that all the guests are comfortable and in­
terested. This is on the same level as the second objective, 
serving an appetizing meal; therefore it would be feasible 
to order these two by intensity. 
Intensity must also be expressed for a definite time 
period because objectives are identified with particular 
times, but also because the lapse of time may bring changes 
in the situation or in the decision maker. For example, sup­
pose two objectives, eating lunch or attending a movie, are 
to be ordered by intensity. Obviously their order of inten­
sity might be reversed from 12:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. because 
these objectives are defined for particular times of day. Or 
consider two possible objectives, getting a good education 
and having a full social life. Intensity order might be re­
versed from age twenty to age thirty because of environmental 
changes. 
Other changes may occur due to changes in taste. It may 
be hypothesized that this takes place rarely while changes 
due to shifts in the decision situation occur more frequently. 
Changes in intensity due to time identification of objectives 
are almost automatic, since these objectives may lose in 
intensity when the appropriate time for their fulfillment has 
passed. 
Intensity is affected by time and also regulates the 
scheduling of time. It may be expressed in willingness to 
postpone the fulfillment of the objective, in the frequency 
of fulfillment of the objective, in the length of the time 
period during which fulfillment is to endure, or in position 
in time with respect to other objectives. 
Intensity as expressed in the placement of objectives 
in time shows itself in several scheduling tendencies. 
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Objectives held most intensely tend to be those chosen for 
immediate fulfillment. Children are good examples ; they are 
unwilling to postpone their pleasures, even for the sake of 
increasing their satisfaction. Many adults, indeed, all 
adults, exhibit the tendency in some degree. A second sched­
uling tendency is to schedule objectives held most intensely, 
for fulfillment during times when they are least likely to 
be interrupted by chance events. A third tendency is to 
schedule intensely held objectives for time periods in which 
the decision maker expects himself to be in a favorable 
physical or psychological condition for fulfillment. In any 
given situation these tendencies may conflict and be exhib­
ited in some compromise which reflects their relative 
strength. 
Intensity of objectives is also exhibited in the willing­
ness of the decision maker to allocate resources which he 
controls to their fulfillment. This facet of decision has 
been so thoroughly explored in the literature of consumption 
theory-*- that there seems little reason for discussing the 
point here except for the reminder that by resources is meant 
all those persons, material objects, time or space, capable 
of being directed toward the fulfillment of alternative 
-*"Willard ¥. Cochrane and Carolyn Shaw Bell. The eco­
nomics of consumption. New York, N. Y., McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc. 1956. pp. 95-134. 
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objectives and within the control of the decision maker. 
A second type of interrelationship of objectives is in 
substitution, complementarity,1 and competition. These re­
lationships may refer to occupancy of time. If this is the 
case, complementary objectives might be those whose fulfill­
ment is enhanced in some respect when their fulfillment 
coincides, while competitive objectives might be those whose 
fulfillment could not occupy the same time period or whose 
fulfillment would be detracted from in some manner if their 
fulfillment coincides. Objectives at different levels of 
operational definition, for example, entertaining friends and 
serving an attractive meal, may be complementary. An example 
of objectives at the same level of operational definition 
which are complementary with respect to time might be worship 
and aesthetic appreciation; the person attending a worship 
service in aesthetically pleasing surroundings may gain a 
higher level of fulfillment of one or both objectives because 
fulfillment coincides. 
The time relationship between objectives complementary 
in time need not be one of coincidence. Fulfillment of ob­
jectives might be enhanced by placement in adjacent time 
periods, or even in periods considerably removed from one 
another. This might mean that the relationship between two 
^As defined in Hicks. Value and capital, p. 44. 
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objectives might be complementary when a lapse of time was 
allowed between fulfillment of one and the other, and com­
petitive when the time periods for fulfillment were adjacent 
or coincident. Objectives competitive with respect to time 
may be illustrated by getting an education and having a full 
social life. Students often schedule these for coincident 
time periods, for example, library dates, but the objectives 
are to a degree competitive in that the student probably can­
not do as much either of studying or of socializing as he 
would like. Competition or complementarity may have their 
effects either in performance of actions necessary to attain 
objectives or in appreciation of attainment. 
Objectives may be related by complementarity and com­
petition with respect to persons; moreover, persons may be 
complements or substitutes with respect to objectives. This 
was not true of objectives with respect to time, since time 
is presumably uniform. If the fulfillment of two objectives 
is in some way enhanced when they involve the same set of 
persons, then they may be said to be complements with respect 
to those persons; if fulfillment of an objective is enhanced 
in some way if two persons are involved in the fulfillment, 
then the persons might be said to be complementary with 
respect to the objective. For example, entertainment and 
study might be complementary with respect to persons, pro­
vided the time scheduling allowed for both, since 
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entertainment might refresh the mind for study and study 
might enhance appreciation of entertainment by contrast. In 
the converse relationship, entertainment may be more pleasant 
if shared by several persons. 
Substitution is not the precise opposite of complemen­
tarity, nor are substitution and competition exactly the same. 
Two factors are substitutes if the inclusion of one renders 
the inclusion of the other less necessary; they are competi­
tive if the inclusion of one renders the inclusion of the 
other less possible or desirable. Substitute objectives 
might be travel and education; note, however, that these are 
substitutes with respect to some higher level objective. 
This characteristic of substitute objectives need not be true 
of complementary or competitive objectives. 
Complementarity and substitution of resources with 
respect to given objectives exhibit their effects in like re­
lationships among objectives, that Is, affect the level of 
attainment of an objective at a given expenditure of re­
sources. The relationships among objectives then influence 
the level of attainment chosen for each objective. 
B. Alternatives 
Alternatives are defined with respect to objectives. 
Assuming an objective is precisely defined by the decision 
maker, he must then consider alternative actions open to him 
and, following a chain of reasoning, anticipate the outcome 
80 
associated with each action. 
1. Definition 
An alternative is one of a set of incongruous elements, 
each capable of fulfilling a common objective in some degree. 
Each alternative is a structure including an activity of the 
decision maker which he might conceivably choose to perform, 
related persons and material objects, and time and space re­
lationships . 
A distinction can be made between set of alternatives 
and decision situation. Besides the alternatives, the de­
cision situation may include elements which enter equally 
into all alternatives or which have no effect on objective 
attainment. Since the decision situation can be global with­
out being troublesome, all limitations on it need not be 
delineated. The decision maker usually does not examine the 
decision situation extensively. In the choice context, his 
interest is confined to the manner in which elements in the 
decision situation may affect his attainment of objectives 
through choice among alternatives. 
Alternatives can be identified as actions of the de­
cision maker which involve other persons and material objects 
and occupy time and space. If the alternative is taken to 
mean the entire set of actions, persons, and material objects 
involved in producing the outcome, then the action of the 
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decision maker may be a trivial part of the alternative, 
perhaps nothing more than a gesture indicating his choice. 
By a reasonable definition, an alternative would include both 
an action and its outcome, since the decision maker considers 
both in deciding among alternatives. 
2. Identification of alternatives within the decision 
situation 
In real situations there may be ambiguity in defining 
limits for a single alternative. Obviously it cannot include 
all actions of the decision maker within a specified period. 
It is not always necessary that the decision maker identify 
the alternative with a specific time period. Nor is it 
reasonable to define an alternative as including an indefi­
nite range of persons and objects, or even of all persons and 
objects which will affect attainment of objective. A more 
reasonable limitation on range of actions, persons, and ob­
jects included in an alternative would be those directly in­
fluenced by the decision maker's choice of actions. Many 
other things may influence attainment of the decision maker's 
objectives, but if they are not influenced by his actions, 
then he cannot be said to choose them since they would occur 
or not occur, whatever his choice. However, these things are 
part of the decision situation and may have considerable in­
fluence on his choice of alternatives, since they may influ­
ence the effectiveness of his actions in attaining his' 
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objectives. 
That alternatives are defined with respect to objectives 
limits the scope of alternatives, but it is hardly possible 
for a decision maker to confine himself to a single objective 
unless it is expressed in such general terms that it is use­
less as a guide for action. Although the decision maker may 
have as a primary goal the attainment of some single objec­
tive, he cannot ignore the effects which his alternative ac­
tions will have on the attainment of other objectives. The 
decision situation is defined with respect to the entire set 
of objectives even though the primary objective defines those 
actions of the decision maker which form the nucleus of 
separate alternatives. That is, each alternative must in­
clude some action of the decision maker which affects his 
attainment of the primary objective, but the alternative may 
include many other actions which do not affect this objective, 
actions oriented toward subordinate objectives. 
The effects of choosing an alternative are not consid­
ered beyond the period specified for attainment of objectives, 
but since some of the decision maker's objectives endure for 
his lifetime or beyond, the time barrier becomes meaningless. 
This is true even if attainment of the primary objective is 
specified precisely for a brief, immediate period. The de­
cision maker may not examine the effects of his actions be­
yond some point in the immediate future; the stronger his 
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time preference the shorter will be the time he considers. 
Moreover, the decision maker may consider the future to be so 
uncertain that he believes it impossible to predict the ef­
fects of his actions beyond some particular point of time. 
C. Characteristics 
Alternatives may be classified according to characteris­
tics. A characteristic is any feature or trait which de­
scribes the alternative. A person or object might be a char­
acteristic, as may some feature of the person or object such 
as size, shape, or action. The fact that what is regarded as 
a single' characteristic in one context might be a whole bun­
dle of characteristics in another is not important in the 
present discussion. 
1. Variation 
Classification implies that each characteristic must be 
present in each alternative to some degree. The degree to 
which it is present may be zero, that is, that characteristic 
may not appear, but this is a basis for classification also. 
Usefulness of characteristics in classification depends 
on their regularity, that is, in their appearance as recog­
nizable variants not only in all alternatives in that de­
cision situation, but also in several decision situations. 
The more familiar the characteristic is to the decision maker 
in all its variants, the more easily and precisely can he 
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classify alternatives through it. Also, the more of recog­
nizable and effective variants a characteristic has, the more 
finely can alternatives be classified. 
2. Effectiveness of variants 
By effective variant is meant one which effects a varia­
tion in outcome. . Not all variations influence outcome. For 
example, suppose the decision maker must choose whether to 
buy Brand X or Brand Y, both of which cost the same, weigh 
the same, are packaged the same, and in fact are the same 
product with brand name as the only varying characteristic. 
Unless the decision maker has a perceptable mental reaction 
to one or the other brand names, the characteristic of being 
X or Y can be said to have an ineffective variation. In 
fact, in the absence of a mental reaction, brand name must 
always be an ineffective variation except as it is an indi­
cation of the presence of effective variations such as quali­
ty and price. 
A variation might be rendered ineffective by the action 
of the decision maker, by forces beyond his control, or by 
some accompanying characteristic. For example, even if Brand 
X and Brand Y were different in quality, this variation would 
have no effect if the chosen good were destroyed before it 
could be used. Or suppose the prices were identical but the 
package of Brand X contained a greater quantity by weight of 
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the product than did Brand Y. This is a variation of one 
characteristic, price per unit of weight. But suppose Brand 
X is less efficient in attaining outcome, so that in fact the 
outcome produced by one package of X exactly equals that from 
one package of Y. Then the variation in weight is ineffec­
tive, at least in the ratio supposed. The effective charac­
teristic is price per unit of realized outcome. 
The skill of the decision maker lies partially in his 
ability to identify characteristics having effective varia­
tions. He is not really interested in any other character­
istics, though he may be aware of them. Moreover, he is not 
interested in characteristics whose effect on outcome is 
identical regardless of alternative chosen. 
Characteristics, then, might be classified as those hav­
ing differential effects on outcome, those having equal ef­
fects on outcome, and those having no effect on outcome. 
Further, the manner in which characteristics affect outcome 
might be termed direct or indirect. Characteristics having 
a direct effect on outcome are those which enter into the 
outcome or which affect characteristics of the outcome. Con­
sider the color and style of a refrigerator. If appearance 
of the refrigerator is part of the outcome, then these char­
acteristics are not only part of alternative refrigerators 
considered for purchase, but are also part of the outcome. 
Suppose that the time required to care for the refrigerator 
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is considered to be part of the outcome of purchase. Then 
automatic defrosting features directly affect a characteris­
tic of the outcome. 
Characteristics having indirect effects on outcome are 
those which affect other characteristics of the alternative 
causing their effect on outcome to be different than they 
would otherwise have been. Consider the characteristic of 
weight in a piece of lawn furniture. This has an effect on 
outcome, though the effect is different depending on whether 
or not the furniture also has wheels. Thus, a single charac­
teristic may enter directly into the outcome, affect other 
characteristics of the outcome, and affect other character­
istics of the alternatives. The effects which a characteris­
tic may have on other characteristics are to alter the degree 
of the outcome characteristic by transforming it into another 
variant of the same characteristic or to change the relation­
ship between outcome characteristics. 
A characteristic may have no effect on the outcome of a 
choice, but may affect characteristics of other decision 
situations, either by altering the effectiveness of charac­
teristics in producing an acceptable outcome or by limiting 
the range of effective choice. For example, suppose the 
immediate decision is among alternative sets of living room 
furniture. The color of the chosen set will alter the ef­
fectiveness of the choice of wall paint. Price is a 
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characteristic whose chief effect is to limit the range of 
effective choice in other decision situations. 
3. Identification and measurement 
Regularities in characteristics enable the decision 
maker to identify them and their effects. One type of regu­
larity identifies a trait as a variant of a single character­
istic on the basis of measurable relationships among the 
variants of the characteristics. A simple example is in the 
characteristic of weight. With the aid of standard measuring 
units the decision maker can indicate the relationship among 
alternatives with respect to this characteristic. 
A second type of regularity is that between the charac­
teristic and outcome. If the variants of some characteristic 
of alternatives have a fixed effect on the variants of some 
characteristic of the outcome, or on other characteristics 
of alternatives or of decision situations, this characteris­
tic furnishes a reliable basis for classifying alternatives. 
Price is an example of a reliable characteristic with respect 
to its limiting effect on alternatives in other decisions. 
Given a limited money income, a higher price paid for the 
chosen alternative in one decision always means that the de­
cision maker has less money to spend in the choice among al­
ternatives in other situations. 
A characteristic may be irregular in its effect on 
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outcome either because there is no real cause and effect re­
lationship between its variants in the alternative and in the 
outcome, or because the effect of the characteristic is in­
fluenced by other characteristics.^ An example of the first 
type of irregularity is the price and the performance of a 
good. Higher price is often but not always associated with 
better performance. The relationship between price and per­
formance may be said to be one of association, rather than of 
cause and effect. An example of the second type of irregu­
larity is the relationship between the quality of the raw 
ingredients of a meal and the palatability of that meal. 
Both quality of the raw ingredients and cooking methods af­
fect palatability. 
If many interacting characteristics affect the outcome, 
it is difficult for the decision maker to predict the effects 
of variation in a single characteristic. It may be possible 
to gain knowledge leading to better prediction of effects by 
experimentation in which only one characteristic at a time 
is allowed to vary and the effects on outcome are noted. If 
there are several characteristics which alter both the out­
come and the effectiveness of each other, and if the range 
of the variation of each of these characteristics is wide, 
^"Fred T. Schreier. Human motivation: probability and 
meaning. Glencoe, 111., The Free Press. 1957- p. 15. 
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the problem of prediction may be unmanageably complex, even 
though experimentation is feasible. In this case it might be 
possible to reclassify the characteristics in such a way that 
there is a minimum of interaction among the characteristics 
of the alternatives and a maximum of regularity with respect 
to effects on outcome. 
One difficulty when describing an alternative by charac­
teristics is that, if the purpose is to classify alternatives 
by characteristics, any characteristics identified in one 
alternative must have an identifiable variant in each of the 
other alternatives. Shape is an example of a characteristic 
having a composite measure which presents this difficulty if 
shape is broken down into a cluster of characteristics. A 
single measure of length which could be recognized as a char­
acteristic of one alternative may have no counterpart in 
another characteristic, but shape might be a characteristic 
of both. 
Measurement of characteristics and their effects fre­
quently is subjective rather than objective. In some cases 
objective measures such as weight, speed, or money cost may 
be conveniently applied; in other cases no objective measures 
have been devised, as, for example, for aesthetic quality. 
Some characteristics require several measures for a complete 
description of the variation. It should always be possible 
to classify an alternative by characteristics in such a way 
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that variants of each characteristic could be measured in 
only one way. Shape, for example, could be broken into a 
cluster of related characteristics which could be measured in 
length, angle, curvature. However, there may be several ob­
jections to this : (a) it may increase interaction among 
characteristics of the alternative and reduce the regularity 
of their effects on outcome, (b) it may increase the diffi­
culty of distinguishing one characteristic from another be­
cause of the need for introducing criteria to delimit them, 
and (c) by increasing the number of effective characteristics 
the task of decision may be made more difficult. For con­
venience, then, the decision maker may substitute a subjec­
tive measure for an objective one, or may define character­
istics in such a way that their effectiveness is most appar­
ent, while the interaction among them is at a minimum, even 
though these characteristics have no single measure. Where 
there is no single measure, the decision maker might use an 
approximate classification of the variants according to only 
one or two of the possible measures of the characteristic, 
or use a single subjective measure such as palatability, 
aesthetic appeal, or ease of operation. 
The use of subjective rather than objective measures by 
the decision maker complicates research having to do with 
decisions because of the difficulty of reproducing these 
measures and describing them, but it makes no difference in 
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the theory of choice. The necessary condition of any measure 
is that it enable the measurer to classify elements into 
subsets. This condition is fulfilled by subjective measures 
as well as objective ones. If some sort of measure can be 
applied to a characteristic, then the alternatives can be 
classified by that characteristic. 
The subsets into which a subjective measure divides 
variants may not be as small as they would be had an objec­
tive been applied. This may be because the decision maker 
cannot perceive minute differences, or because he indicates 
as having an identical measure all those variants whose ef­
fect on outcome is, in the decision maker's estimation, 
identical. The first reason for a coarser subdivision, that 
of lack of ability to perceive minute differences, is called 
the threshold effect. The second reason involves expediency 
in coming to a decision. 
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VI. RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE CHOICE SITUATION 
Choice is made on the basis of relationships among ele­
ments, that is, objectives, alternatives, and characteris­
tics, in the choice situation. As a preliminary to analyzing 
influences on choice, it is worth while to examine the struc­
ture and content of relationships in order to gain further 
insight into the nature of the choice situation. 
A. Structure 
Three relationship structures may be distinguished among 
those effective in choice; these are inclusion, measure, and 
mapping. Inclusion relates elements within a set to its 
boundaries, measure relates elements within a set to each 
other, and mapping relates elements of different sets. 
1. Inclusion 
The relationship of inclusion is exemplified by equal 
to, greater or less than, indifferent or preferred to, east 
of, five miles from, as they refer to bounds of set; for ex­
ample, if A is greater than B it belongs to the set of ele­
ments of which B is a lower bound or criterion for admissi­
bility. A set is bounded by elements; inclusion or exclusion 
is determined by relationship to those elements. In the 
statement, "the chosen alternative was preferred to all other 
feasible alternatives,11 several sets are implied : the set of 
alternatives, the subset of feasible alternatives bounded by 
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feasibility criteria, and the subset of the one chosen al­
ternative which is bounded by the other elements in the 
feasible set. 
2. Measure 
Measure relationships represent inclusion as it applies 
to partitioning of elements within a set. It relates pairs 
of elements; for example, A greater than B or preferred to 
B. The set of A greater than B is of no immediate interest; 
only the particular A and B. The distinction between inclu­
sion and measure is in emphasis only; inclusion stresses the 
relation between elements and bounds of a set, while measure 
stresses the relation between two elements within a set. 
3. Mapping 
The mapping relationship associates members of different 
sets. For example, there is the relationship between quanti­
ty of a commodity and its price. Or one might say that an 
alternative has three characteristics, price, outcome, and 
time required for realizing outcome. This is the same as 
saying that to name the alternative is to specify mapping re­
lationships with prices, times and outcomes. 
A mapping relationship might be regular or irregular. 
If the price of commodity is fifty cents per pound, the map­
ping is regular, but if the price is between twenty-five and 
fifty cents, depending on unspecified factors, either mapping 
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is not regular or regularities are not specified. 
B. Content 
Content of relationships may be categorized as physical, 
preference, time, and space. Every relationship has struc­
ture and content; moreover, two elements may be related by 
all four types of content.-
1. Physical relationships 
By physical relationships are meant those which can be 
perceived and measured comparably, not only by the decision 
maker but also by other persons. Evidence for these rela­
tionships is direct and tangible. Though the measurements 
given for physical relationships may differ from one person 
to another, or from one decision situation to another, the 
differences are due to error or intention rather than varia­
tion in measuring scale. 
Having identified a characteristic and its variants, the 
next step is to examine the physical relationships among 
variants. These physical relationships must exist, for they 
are the basis for identifying a trait as a variant of a char­
acteristic. Consider the characteristic, money price. The 
variants of this are different quantities of money, measured 
in cardinal units, i.e., dollars. The physical relationship 
among any two prices may be of ordinal form, that is, greater 
than, equal to, or less than, or of cardinal form, that is, 
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five dollars greater or less than. 
These are relationships of inclusion. The two traits 
Pj and p2 are identified first as being variants of the char­
acteristic money price, i.e., elements included in the set P 
called money price. Then the statement that p2 is greater 
than pj means that p2 is included in that subset of P con­
taining all p's greater than p^. Inclusion in the set P, 
money price, is defined in terms of certain specifications, 
as, loosely, pj is a variant of the characteristic, money 
price, if it is a sum of money and if possession of a good is 
to be obtained only by the surrender of p^. The specifica­
tions for membership in the set of all p's greater than pj 
might be described in some similar manner. The variants pj, 
and pg are related both by their common inclusion in P and by 
a measure relationship between them. 
Besides relationships of inclusion, physical relation­
ships among elements include mapping relationships, that is, 
each element of an alternative (variant of a characteristic) 
is mapped onto the outcome. An element may have a mapping 
relationship with one or more elements of the outcome and/or 
of alternatives. For example, choice of upholstery fabric 
(a characteristic of alternatives) is related to the appear­
ance of the chair, ease of care, and the length of its wear 
life (characteristics of the outcome). It is also related 
to the money cost of the chair (a characteristic of the 
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alternative) and to the aesthetic quality of the room (the 
outcome of several decisions). 
Suppose that the characteristics of an alternative are 
defined in such a way that each variant of a characteristic 
is the focus of two types of relationships : it is related to 
each other variant of the characteristic by inclusion and 
measure, and also to one or more other characteristics by 
mapping. For example, suppose a chair is to be covered with 
either nylon or cotton upholstery fabric; the nylon fabric 
may be expected to last five years, the cotton two. The two 
fabrics are related to each other by their inclusion in the 
set of upholstery fabrics and are also related by mapping to 
the set of time periods during which upholstery fabrics last. 
Both relationships are pertinent to choice. 
2. Preference relationships 
Preference relationships are based on physical ones, but 
are different in that any specific measure is valid only for 
the person making it. Preference applies to variants of a 
characteristic, that is, one variant is preferred to another 
by the decision maker, but the bases for preference among 
variants are relationships among characteristics. The de­
cision maker's preferences are really among variants of the 
characteristics of outcome, but he has derived preferences 
for the characteristics of alternatives mapped onto charac­
teristics of outcome. This means, for example, that the 
decision maker has no direct preference for paying a smaller 
price for a good; his preference is for some characteristic 
of the outcome, e.g., additional goods and services, which 
can be obtained with money released by the smaller price. 
Characteristics such as color, which enter directly into out­
come, may take their preference order as characteristics of 
the alternative directly from their preference order as char­
acteristics of outcome. 
Measurement by the decision maker of his preference re­
lationships may be very complex, since a characteristic may 
be mapped onto several other characteristics. The manner in 
which mapping relationships help to order preferences within 
an alternative cannot be explored here. 
Preference relationships must also exist among charac­
teristics in order for the decision maker to choose among 
them. An example is preference between two meals, one tast­
ing good, the other looking attractive. Unless the decision 
maker can order taste and attractiveness by preference, he 
cannot decide between the two meals. 
As an ordering relationship preference may be transi­
tive; that is, if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to 
C, then A is preferred to C. Also, A not preferred to B and 
B not preferred to A does not necessarily imply that A is 
equal to B; it may indicate that the decision maker is in­
different between A and B although they are not equal. 
If the threshold effect is allowed, then indifference is 
not necessarily transitive. Suppose one characteristic vari­
ant is preferred to another only if the first is physically 
related to the second (e.g., greater than) by n or more 
units. If A is greater than B by less than n units and if B 
is greater than C by less than n units but A is greater than 
C by n or more units, then A is not preferred to B because 
the difference between them is small and B is not preferred 
to C for the same reason but A is preferred to C because the 
difference between them is large enough to be perceptible. 
If the threshold effect is not allowed, that is, if the de­
cision maker is assumed to perceive infinitely small grada­
tions of difference, then transitivity extends to the indif­
ference relationship. 
3. Time 
Time relationships are a special kind of physical rela­
tion. When one speaks of a point in time one always means a 
duration because time is a flow. A point in time has the 
same physical unreality as a point in space. The possible 
relationships between two periods of time are that they coin­
cide, that some portions of them coincide, or that no por­
tions of them coincide. For portions of time which do not 
coincide, the terms earlier than or later than may be applied 
to indicate the position of one period of time with respect 
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to another. 
There are two time relations, duration and position. 
Two time periods may be compared with each other directly in 
these respects; that is, one may be said to endure longer 
than the other, or to begin earlier or later than the other. 
Or the two time periods may be compared to each other by re­
lating them with a third indication of time, for example, one 
may be said to begin Tuesday while the other began Wednesday. 
Time relationships have meaning only with respect to 
other relationships, that is, the statement that one charac­
teristic is earlier or coincident with another is meaning­
less. A meaningful statement would be to the effect that the 
duration of characteristic A's inclusion in set 0 coincides 
with the duration of characteristic B's inclusion in the same 
set or a different one. Or one might say that the duration 
of the mapping relationship between A and B has some rela­
tionship to the duration of an event D. 
Preference relationships are based on time relationships 
as well as other physical ones. This is exemplified in the 
time preference exhibited for attainment of outcomes. If the 
decision maker's preferences were not influenced by time re­
lationships, he would be indifferent to identical outcomes 
occurring now or in the future, provided that they were 
equally likely to occur. 
Inclusion relationships may be based on time 
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relationships, for example, a set may be defined as all those 
elements existing during some period of time. This leads to 
the conclusion that certain socalled functional relationships 
are really inclusion relationships based on time relation­
ships. The appearance of one characteristic may be taken as 
an indication of another, not so easily observed, character­
istic because they are known to occur together in time, but 
in fact the time relationship may be the only direct rela­
tionship between them; their functional (mapping) relation­
ships may be with additional characteristics. If the time 
relationship between two characteristics is regular, it may 
be a good basis for prediction. It is also a good indication 
that other physical or preference relationships exist between 
the two characteristics, either directly, or indirectly 
through a third characteristic. 
4. Space 
Space resembles time in that it is a form of physcial 
relationship, but it might also refer to preference. Just as 
duration and position describe time relationships, extent and 
contiguity describe relationships of space. Extent refers to 
the area or volume measure of characteristics. Contiguity 
refers to position of one element or characteristic relative 
to another. 
An importance of spatial relationships is in the limita­
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tions which they place on the effectiveness of characteris­
tics with respect to outcome. This can be exemplified in 
many ways : by scheduling problems, differences in the ease 
of manipulation of elements, or by preference ordering of 
spatial characteristics of outcome. 
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VII. INFORMATION 
Information is not an element of alternatives, but a 
relationship between decision situation and decision maker. 
Extent and certainty of the decision maker's information 
affects his evaluation of alternatives and limits his choice. 
The decision rule which he uses may take information into 
account. Therefore, choice research must take the decision 
maker's information into account, either as an assumption or 
as part of the investigation. Some implications of informa­
tion states with respect to choice are discussed below. 
A. Definition 
Information is the set of facts or data perceived by the 
decision maker as a description of relationships and elements 
in the real world. It is an awareness of physical, time, and 
space relationships and is the basis for preference. 
Information might be classified as public and individ­
ualized. Public information is that which might be useful to 
anyone, for example, information about prices, average life­
time of durable goods, majority opinion concerning the merits 
of goods, or the results of standardized tests. Individual­
ized information describes the decision maker's situation. 
For example, the price of a good is public information but 
the relation between that price and the amount of money in 
the decision maker's bank account is individualized. Average 
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lifetime of a good for all consumers is public information 
but expected or realized lifetime of the same good under the 
conditions of use peculiar to the decision maker is individu­
alized. 
Public information is gathered and disseminated more or 
less widely among consumers by public or private agencies. 
Retail stores publish information about their wares through 
advertisements, displays, labels, and word of mouth communi­
cations by their paid representatives. Other business firms 
use the same methods though it may be to different audiences. 
Governmental and private education agencies conduct research 
and publish findings and other information in bulletins, 
magazines, and word of mouth communications. Even informa­
tion obtained in casual conversation with friends might be 
termed semipublic. All information is useful to the consumer 
to the degree that he is able to perceive it as part of his 
own situation. By this interpretation it becomes individual­
ized information. Research agencies often perform the in­
terpretation in the reverse direction; that is, they gather 
individualized data and interpret it so as to transform it 
into public information. For example, consumer characteris­
tics such as disposable income are aggregated to produce 
public information. 
The information discussed above may or may not have been 
true information conforming to reality; the decision maker 
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usually has a good deal of misinformation which he may treat 
as if it were true information. Often he cannot distinguish 
between true information and misinformation, either because 
the situation does not allow him to observe relations 
directly or because measuring techniques are inadequate for 
obtaining correct information. In addition to errors such 
as those which cannot be remedied easily, the decision maker 
often uses misinformation because it has not seemed worth 
while to correct or improve the information he has. The dis­
advantage of holding incorrect information may be slight, 
while the cost of checking to see whether information is cor­
rect and then obtaining correct information may be great. 
An additional source of error in information is due to 
bias in observing and interpreting data. Suppose reality is 
regarded as a network of relationships. Then there may well 
be a set of key relationships which encompass the whole of 
reality. A knowledge of these relationships would enable one 
to understand any situation with little difficulty, since it 
would only be necessary to identify these key relationships 
in the situation and follow out their implications. No con­
tradiction can exist in reality, so that any information 
consonant with these key relationships would almost certainly 
be correct. 
A correct master set would be without contradiction, 
either within itself or with any outside data. Suppose that 
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the decision maker has in his mind such a master set of re­
lationships or, more likely, fragments of several sets. Some 
part of the set is incorrect; there are inconsistencies and 
contradictions within the set, but it serves, nevertheless, 
to guide his perception of data. Observing, not the whole 
situation, but cues which his master set teaches him to look 
for, the decision maker compares these with his master set 
and, adopting the interpretation which seems to embody the 
least contradiction between cues and master set, he "observes" 
certain relationships in the situation. If his master set is 
not entirely correct, then some of these relationships are 
probably incorrect, no matter how carefully or extensively he 
examines cues. 
B. States of Completeness 
Of the elements and relationships in a real situation, 
only part may be mapped on the decision maker's information 
set. Three possibilities may be distinguished, global, com­
plete and partial mapping of information. 
1. Global information 
Global information encompasses all relationships within 
and among all elements in the alternatives and the decision 
situation in general, no matter how these elements are de­
fined. It is impossible for human beings to have global in­
formation, first because one has insufficient time to become 
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aware of all relationships, and second because many rela­
tionships are too minute or too confused to be detected by 
observation, either directly or by using instruments. 
2. Complete information 
Complete information represents all the knowledge of 
relationships possible to the decision maker, provided he is 
a keen and careful observer and has at his command all exist­
ing instruments for the detection and measurement of rela­
tions . 
Unless measurements can be made infinitely precise, in­
formation cannot be said to be global. Because infinite pre­
cision is impossible to attain and also carries little or no 
advantage over somewhat less precision in its use as the 
basis for decision making, completeness is defined as the 
more attainable state. But the degree of precision marking 
the difference between global and complete, if it is not to 
be infinite, must be defined operationally, that is, in prac­
tice some degree of precision will be sufficient for com­
pleteness . 
Some relations cannot be known without altering the re­
lations themselves. For example, if the situation includes 
the actions of other persons, then to ask them in advance 
what their behavior will be in this or that event is often 
an alteration in the situation sufficient to change their 
107 
behavior from what it would otherwise have been. Some rela­
tions cannot be known without altering other relations. In 
decisions regarding food one cannot know about palatability 
without tasting, but in so doing one alters other relations, 
for example, the shape and quantity of food, one's own appe­
tite, the money cost of choosing. In cases such as this, 
complete information is defined to include a knowledge of re­
lations, even though they can be measured only after the 
event. 
3. Partial information 
The third and most likely information state is that of 
partial information. In this case the decision maker is 
aware of only some of the relations in the situation. He 
might know all the inclusion relationships among certain 
elements, but not be aware of all mapping relationships. For 
example, he might know the exact money cost of each alterna­
tive, but not know how this was related to quality or to the 
cost of future wants.-
C. States of Certainty 
The terms certainty, uncertainty, and risk refer to de­
gree of confirmation or state of belief. If a relationship 
is consistent with other relationships in the information set 
and inconsistent with none, it is completely confirmed; if it 
is consistent with some relationships and inconsistent only 
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with incompletely confirmed relationships, it may be regarded 
as partially confirmed. 
1. Certainty 
A relationship which is known with certainty is com­
pletely confirmed. Such knowledge might be part of either 
complete or partial information. 
Confirmation of a relationship may be by direct measure­
ment of the elements involved, or it may be by measurement of 
other elements with a known relationship to the ones to be 
confirmed. Often only the indirect confirmation can be ob­
tained. Whether or not indirect confirmation alone can be 
allowed to prove certainty must depend on convention or the 
judgment of the decision maker. 
2. Uncertainty 
A relationship which is known with uncertainty is un­
confirmed or may not be known at all or only within a range. 
That is, the decision maker might know that the true rela­
tionship falls within the range of all possible variations 
of that relationship, or perhaps within a subset of that set, 
but that subset is so large that the decision maker is not 
able to use the relationship to classify alternatives into 
subsets. Uncertainty may not seriously disadvantage the de­
cision maker. He may be able to classify alternatives satis­
factorily by other relationships. 
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In distinguishing between certainty and uncertainty the 
decision maker may be guided by conventions, by criteria 
which he sets up, or by his intuition and state of optimism. 
For example, suppose a stranger informs the decision maker 
that he is John Doe and asks him to cash a check. Is this 
information, that the.stranger is John Doe, certain or un­
certain? It is unconfirmed; however, it is also uncontra­
dicted. Will the decision maker accept the information be­
cause of the stranger's honest face, his own good spirits, 
and his past experience of honesty in strangers? Will he 
accept the information as certain only when he has seen the 
man's driver's license, when disinterested persons have tes­
tified to the man's identity, when he knows the result of an 
expert's comparison of the man's fingerprints with prints re­
corded as belonging to John Doe, or will he continue to re­
gard the information as uncertain even with all this con­
firmation? If certainty is to be recognized as a real state, 
some degree of confirmation must be specified as a criterion 
distinguishing certainty from uncertainty. 
3. Risk 
Risk differs from both certainty and uncertainty. Sup­
pose the decision maker has partial confirmation for the be­
lief that the true relation falls within some subset of pos­
sible relations. This is not uncertainty, though it might be 
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transformed Into that condition by enlarging the subset to 
include all possible relations. But, though the decision 
maker does not have certain information, he is better off 
than under uncertainty, because the subset within which he 
expects the relationship to fall is sufficiently small that 
it may be used in ordering alternatives. Suppose he enlarges 
the subset within which he expects the true element to fall. 
If he has chosen likely elements to add to the set, then he 
should consider it even more likely that the true relation 
would be contained in the enlarged set. 
If he were able to assign some sort of numerical value 
to these likelihoods, say that in fifty cases out of a hun­
dred the relationship would be included in the first set and 
in seventy cases out of a hundred it would be in the enlarged 
set, and if he progressively enlarged his subset, beginning 
with a very small one and continuing until all possible re­
lations had been included, then the numerical values which 
he assigned to each subset would form a probability distribu­
tion. Even though persons cannot always assign numerical 
values to their estimates of likelihood, the concept of risk 
may sometimes be valid without precise measures. 
D. Cost of Information 
To obtain information the decision maker may incur 
costs, defined as alteration in characteristics of the 
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decision situation. Suppose the decision maker, sensing the 
need for decision, acts to gain information on which to base 
his choice. He may obtain what he considers sufficient in­
formation in a few minutes' time or for months he may devote 
a large portion of his time, energy, and other resources to 
gathering and confirming information. Whether the time re­
quired is short or long, it causes a delay during which the 
decision maker cannot make a choice and act upon it. This 
delay may be of little importance or in some situations may 
seriously limit his field of choice as the passage of time 
makes some alternatives unobtainable. Some characteristics 
of the alternatives may change over time. Because resources 
are used to obtain information, these cannot be used to 
actuate the choice. Public information may be given to the 
decision maker free of money cost or at a price, but at least 
a small amount of time and energy is required to comprehend 
the information. More often the decision maker must actively 
seek information in order to choose satisfying outcomes. 
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VIII. A MODEL OF CHOICE 
In the preceding chapters the elements and relationships 
of choice have been discussed; they are now to be fitted to­
gether into an integrated description of choice which can be 
used in designing research and interpreting data. 
The model will be discussed first under the simplifying 
assumption that the decision maker has complete information; 
then some modifications appropriate to the partial and un­
certain information case will be mentioned. 
A. Choice Under Conditions of Complete Information 
1. Assumptions 
Several conditions are to be assumed. First, as has 
been noted, the decision maker has complete information. 
Moreover, he is certain and has no need to make allowances 
for probabilities of less than one. He is able to evaluate 
information without cost, and therefore excludes nothing from 
consideration. 
Second, the alternatives are already identified by the 
decision maker, which implies that his objectives must also 
have been defined. Since he has complete information, the 
precise physical measure of all characteristics of the al­
ternatives are also known to him. From knowledge of his 
environment, the decision maker is able both to order 
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characteristics by preference and to identify the limits of 
feasibility. 
Preference order, as expressed by the decision maker, is 
assumed to have some regular relationship with physical 
order. However, this relation may differ for different 
characteristics. And, finally, the model is based on the 
assumption that choice can be identified by a rule based on 
the decision maker's preference. 
2. The set of alternatives 
Suppose that the choice situation is defined as follows: 
A set of alternatives is open to the decision maker, who must 
choose some element in this set and cannot choose outside of 
the set. Each alternative is defined as a single element in 
the set. The set of alternatives is identified with respect 
to the accomplishment of some objective or set of objectives 
and contains every alternative capable of fulfilling the ob­
jective in some degree. If the objective is modified or 
changed in any way, then the entire choice situation is al­
tered, in the identification not only of the set of alterna­
tives but also of the relationships among those alternatives. 




Each alternative is a bundle of characteristics which, 
taken together, completely describe the alternative; for ex­
ample, one characteristic might be money cost, another might 
be the quantity of time consumed in carrying out the actions 
included in the alternative. Each alternative might have a 
large number of characteristics. Now suppose the decision 
maker surveys the entire set of alternatives and, for each 
alternative, notes a single characteristic, money cost. This 
characteristic might vary from one alternative to another. 
Variations in money cost could be aggregated to form a set of 
characteristic variations. Similarly the time consumed in 
each alternative might be measured and the variations identi­
fied as a second set of characteristic variations. 
Each characteristic of an alternative would be a member 
of a set of characteristic variations, tiàch characteristic 
of an alternative would be related to the other characteris­
tics of the alternative through their common association with 
that alternative, but each characteristic would also be re­
lated to a characteristic of each of the other alternatives 
also, as being a variant or level of a common characteristic. 
4. Sets of characteristic variants 
-The variants of a single characteristic, for example, 
money cost, comprise its characteristic set. If each 
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alternative has n different characteristics, then there are n 
characteristic sets. Any single characteristic set has a 
characteristic variant for each alternative. Characteristic 
set might be defined as a universal set containing all pos­
sible variations of that characteristic. In that case, the 
characteristic set for any set of alternatives would be a 
subset of the universal set. The alternatives might be said 
to have a mapping relationship with the characteristic set, 
and the process of obtaining information about alternatives 
would be a mapping operation from the universal set. 
5- Relationships among characteristic variants 
Any single element or variant of a characteristic set is 
physically related to any other element of the same set. The 
physical relationship completely orders the set; that is, for 
any pair of characteristic variants contained in the set, the 
first must be greater than, equal to, or less than the second 
with respect to that physical relationship. 
The physical measure of one characteristic need not be 
the same as the physical measure of other characteristics of 
the alternative. For example, if one characteristic is money 
cost, another is time requirement, and a third is color, the 
first characteristic might be measured in dollars, the second 
in minutes, and the third in a compound measure containing 
hue, value, and intensity. 
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The decision maker considers and compares characteristic 
variants rather than alternatives as a whole. Suppose he con­
siders the characteristic of money cost : he considers the 
money cost of each alternative and forms a preference order­
ing of these money costs. This preference ordering complete­
ly orders the characteristic set and is regularly related 
with physical ordering; that i.s, if the elements of the char­
acteristic set were arranged according to their physical 
measure, they would exhibit some regularity of arrangement 
viewed by their preference relationship. 
Three of the possible relationships between physical 
ordering and preference orderings are illustrated below: 
a 
a. 
A B C 
Every point on the line ab represents an element of a single 
characteristic set measured in physical units on the horizon­
tal axis and preference units on the vertical axis. For pur­
poses of representation, cardinal measures are assumed. In 
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A any variant which is physically greater than another is 
also preferred to it, in B any variant which is physically 
less than another is preferred to it, and in C any variant of 
less than a certain physical measure is preferred to variants 
physically less than it, but variants greater than that phys­
ical measure are preferred to variants which are physically 
greater than themselves. 
Relationship A might represent a characteristic involved 
in ease of care of a durable good; the easier the care, the 
more preferred would be the alternative. B might show the 
relationship between preference for money cost and the phys­
ical measure. An example of the relationship illustrated in 
C might be the size of a piece of furniture; up to a point 
the decision maker might prefer the larger television screen, 
but beyond that size the disadvantages of finding space for 
a larger piece might make him prefer a smaller one. 
6. Preference ordering of unimportant characteristics 
One aspect of the decision situation which may seem to 
complicate choice but which need not is the large number of 
characteristics which an alternative might have. Many of 
these might be of little practical importance in the decision, 
or, in other words, be ineffective in the outcome. Prefer­
ence ordering of the characteristic variants makes this 
relatively easy to handle. Those deemed by the decision 
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maker to be of little or no importance are given identical 
preference ratings, that is, the preference relation among 
the elements in such a characteristic set is one of indiffer­
ence. If all variants of that characteristic are equally 
preferred, the set has no effect on choice and can be ig­
nored. Thus, while in theory all possible characteristics 
enter into the decision, the number which actually affect 
choice may be small. If evaluation of characteristics cannot 
be accomplished without cost, an initial choice might be to 
rate all but a few selected characteristics as indifferently 
preferred. 
7. Partial ordering of alternatives by characteristic 
variants 
If each of the characteristic sets mapped onto the set 
of alternatives is completely ordered by a preference rela­
tionship, then the set of alternatives is partially ordered 
by those preference relationships. With respect to any al­
ternative in the set, this means that three subsets of al­
ternatives can be defined. One subset contains all those al­
ternatives which are equally or more preferred in all their 
characteristics to the specified alternative; a second sub­
set contains all those alternatives to which the specified 
alternative is equally or more preferred in all characteris­
tics; and the third subset contains all those alternatives 
which are contained in neither the first nor the second 
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subset. These three subsets completely exhaust the set of 
alternatives. Note that the specified alternative is a mem­
ber of the first subset and also of the second. This is one 
partition which may be made on the basis of preference order-
ings alone. Similar partitions may be made on the basis of 
physical orderings. 
Suppose that the set of alternatives is partitioned in 
several ways as described above. For example, it might be 
partitioned into three subsets by a selected alternative on 
the basis of preference, then partitioned by physical order 
and the additional partitions superimposed on the first; then 
one or more of the subsets might be partitioned by a selected 
element within each subset. Proceeding in this way the set 
of alternatives might be partitioned as minutely as desired. 
Instead of partitioning the set of alternatives by se­
lecting single alternatives within the set, the partitioning 
might be done by selecting a single variant of a character­
istic. For example, suppose the decision maker selected some 
specific money cost. Then the set of alternatives could be 
partitioned into two subsets, that containing all alterna­
tives costing no more than the specified money cost and that 
containing all alternatives costing more than that cost. 
Again, by successively selecting variants, either from a sin­
gle characteristic or from different characteristics, and 
partitioning on the basis of the selected variants, the set 
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of alternatives could be partitioned as minutely as desired. 
Once the alternative or characteristic variant is se­
lected, the partition remains only to be recognized. It is 
the basis for selecting the alternative or variant which is 
a matter for choice. The decision maker must do two things: 
(a) specify the alternatives or variants to be used as cri­
teria and (b) specify the order in which'criteria are to be 
used in partitioning the set. Order in partitioning may or 
may not make a difference but, in cases where it does, order 
must be specified. 
8. Feasible subsets 
Suppose that the decision maker has limited resources, 
for example, time or money. Then one variant of the charac­
teristic money cost might be identified as the extreme limit 
of the amount that he was able to spend on any of the alter­
natives. This variant would act as a criterion to partition 
the set of alternatives into two subsets, one feasible with 
respect to money cost and the other not feasible. Suppose 
that on time expenditure there was also a limit which could 
be identified and would partition the set of alternatives. 
Taken together (in this case order of applying criteria would 
be irrelevant), these two characteristics would partition 
the set into four subsets : (a) those alternatives feasible 
with respect to both time and money, (b) those feasible with 
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respect to money but not time, (c) those feasible with re­
spect to time but not money, and (d) those feasible in 
neither respect. If no more than one of subsets (c), (d), 
and (b) were empty, then both time and money might be termed 
constraining characteristics, that is, both characteristics 
exclude some alternatives from the feasible set. 
In the foregoing example, feasibility was defined with 
respect to physical order. It might be defined with respect 
to preference ordering as well. For example, suppose some 
variants of a characteristic, perhaps hues of a color, fla­
vors, or shapes, were unacceptable with respect to prefer­
ence. If these variants were really unacceptable in the 
sense that they would never be chosen, they also would bound 
the feasible set. The feasible set contains all alternatives 
which the decision maker need consider, since his choice must 
be made from that set. 
9. Preferred subsets 
The feasible set is likely to be much smaller than the 
entire set of alternatives, but it may be possible to narrow 
still further the set to be considered. Any selected alter­
native might partition the set to which it belongs into two 
subsets : (a) the subset containing all those alternatives 
which are equally or less well preferred in all characteris­
tics to the selected alternative, and (b) the remaining 
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alternatives. Suppose an alternative is selected in such a 
way as to make subset (a) as large as possible. Then choice 
may be limited to (b ), which might be called -the preferred 
set, since any member of (b) must be equally or more pre­
ferred to any member of (a). 
Some ambiguity arises from the fact that there might be 
some alternatives in (a) which were equally preferred in all 
characteristics to some alternative in (b). There is no 
reason why these alternatives might not be chosen even though 
they were members of (a); on the other hand, if the two al­
ternatives were really indifferently preferred, there is no 
reason why they should be. The confusion is easily elimi­
nated by adding a further condition, that alternatives in (a) 
must be less well preferred in at least one characteristic 
to any alternative in the preferred set. 
If the choice is made under conditions of complete in­
formation and on the basis of preference orderings, it must 
belong to the preferred set. But to distinguish a single 
preferred alternative some decision rule must be applied 
since in many cases the preferred set will contain more than 
one element. 
10. Decision rules 
One simple type of decision rule would be to choose an 
alternative from the preferred set which has the highest 
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preference rank on some specified characteristic, disregard­
ing preferences for any other characteristic. The decision 
concerning the particular characteristic on which to base 
choice might be made at some previous time for an entire set 
of decisions or might be made as a preliminary choice to ap­
ply only to the situation in question. If a person always 
chose the alternative costing the least money, he could be 
presumed to follow this rule. But suppose two alternatives 
were equal in this characteristic and cost less money than 
any other alternative. An additional specification would be 
needed to identify a unique choice. This might take the form 
of choosing the more preferred alternative according to a 
second characteristic, or the lexocographic principle of 
choice.^ 
The lexocographic principle might take on many specific 
forms. For example, the chosen alternative might be identi­
fied on the basis of preference ordering of a single charac­
teristic but be chosen from a subset of the preferred set. 
This subset would be identified by additional constraints on 
specified characteristics. Or the preferred set of alterna­
tives might be narrowed by applying successively higher con­
straints on characteristics arranged in some order, perhaps 
!n. Georgescu-Roegen. Choice, expectations and measur-
ability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58: 502-53^. 1954. 
124 
the order reflecting the decision maker's preference for 
characteristics. 
A second type of decision rule would involve the random 
selection of an alternative from the set of alternatives or 
from some subset of alternatives. This rule should not be 
overlooked; it may be that random selection does take place 
in some instances. 
A third general type of rule is based on interrelation­
ships among characteristic orderings, either preference or 
physical. If the interrelationship can be expressed as a 
mathematical function, then the element may be chosen by max­
imizing this function. A simple (but important) decision sit­
uation in which this type of rule is used is the case of the 
producer who wishes to maximize profit. In his case the 
characteristics in which he is interested, i.e., inputs and 
output, are all measured by a common preference unit, dol­
lars, and profit is a function of the dollar value of the 
characteristics. Maximization may be over the entire set of 
alternatives or over some subset defined by relevant cri­
teria. 
11. Interpretation of partitions 
The usefulness for research of the preference ordering 
of characteristics lies in the fact that, if the preference 
orderings of each of the characteristic sets is known or can 
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be reconstructed from indirect evidence (regular relation­
ships between physical orderings and preference orderings can 
be used for this), then any selected alternative partitions 
the set of alternatives into a number of subsets of known 
properties. Suppose the data included preference orderings 
and the identification of the alternative which was actually 
chosen. Then the following subsets could be distinguished: 
( 1) The set of all those alternatives preferred or in­
different in all their characteristics to all the 
characteristics of the chosen alternative. 
(2) The set containing all those alternatives to all 
of whose characteristics the characteristics of the 
chosen alternative are preferred or indifferent. 
These subsets may be understood more easily from exam­
ples and further interpretation. In the case in which subset 
(l) is not empty, i.e., the case in which it contains one or 
more alternatives other than the chosen alternative, the 
chosen alternative either is not the most preferred alterna­
tive or the decision maker employed some criterion other than 
the presumed preferences in making his choice. This would 
indicate that his decision situation ought to be examined 
further. 
Subset (2) is the rejected subset, but it may include 
some members of the preferred subset. If so, choice must 
have been based on a decision rule. 
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Subset (3) Is the subset containing all those alterna­
tives preferred to the chosen one with respect to a charac­
teristic C and no alternatives preferred with respect to 
characteristic M. Suppose further that, when new alterna­
tives are introduced into the situation, they are chosen if 
and only if they are preferred to the original choice with 
respect to either C or M and are less preferred in neither. 
Then one of these characteristics may be termed the con­
straining characteristic and the other the maximized charac­
teristic. If C is the constraining characteristic, subset 
(3) is the feasible set. 
The only distinction between the constraining and the 
maximized characteristics is in the capabilities and inten­
tions of the decision maker : he does not choose less pre­
ferred variants of the constraining characteristic because he 
is unable to do so; he would prefer to choose more preferred 
variants of the maximized characteristic but is unable to do 
so because they are linked with less preferred constraining 
variants. 
But under certain circumstances the constraining and 
maximized characteristic and the feasible set can be identi­
fied if only one of them is known. Suppose that the alterna­
tives and the preference order of their characteristics were 
known to the researcher and that in these alternatives all 
possible permutations of characteristic variants were 
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present. Then from a knowledge of the chosen alternative and 
one of the following, constrained or maximized characteristic 
or feasible set, the other two could be deduced. The chosen 
alternative always contains (a) the variant of the constrain­
ing characteristic which bounds the feasible set and (b) the 
most preferred variant of the maximized characteristic within 
the feasible set. 
The above is true especially if there is only one maxi­
mized and one constrained characteristic. If there are sev­
eral of each, they may be more difficult to identify. 
To summarize, research could furnish information as to 
the identity of constraining characteristics, that is,, those 
characteristics for which the variant of the characteristic 
attached to the chosen alternative is usually the boundary of 
feasibility. Money cost is usually assumed to be the con­
straining characteristic, and it often may be so, but it 
would be well to have more evidence on this point. It may be 
that, in some classes of consumer decisions, characteristics 
other than money constrain choice. If certain characteris­
tics were known or assumed to be the constraining character­
istics, then data on actual choice would furnish evidence con­
cerning the location of the bounds of feasibility fixed by 
decision makers. 
An alternative question for research might be the iden­
tity of characteristics to be maximized. Suppose the chosen 
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alternative had attached to it one or more characteristics 
which were not at the bounds of feasibility on those charac­
teristics but were at the bounds of the feasible set ; then 
these must be characteristics which the decision maker max­
imized by his choice. For example, if money was the con­
straining characteristic, then the set of all conceivable 
alternatives could be partitioned into those feasible with 
respect to money and those not feasible. If, within the set 
feasible with respect to money, the decision maker chose the 
alternative most preferred on some other characteristic, for 
example, palatability, then that other characteristic must be 
the one he wishes to maximize. The boundary variant of the 
constraining characteristic is the variant least preferred 
in the feasible set; the chosen variant of the maximized 
characteristic is the one most preferred in the feasible 
set. 
Another point on which it should be possible to gain 
evidence is the relation between the physical variation of 
any particular characteristic and the preference ordering of 
these variations. It has been hypothesized that this is a 
regular relationship, but there are several possible' forms 
for this regularity. If characteristics can be identified 
in such a way that they pertain to many products having the 
same general use, then the relationship between physical 
variation of and preference for characteristics may be a 
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better guide for predicting choice, recommending products 
to consumers, or creating new products than information about 
demand for or satisfaction with each product considered as 
a whole. The information might also be more economical to 
obtain and might be valid for a longer time and for a wider 
range of products. 
A fourth point of investigation has to do with the im­
provement of choice. If the set of alternatives equally or 
more preferred in all characteristics to the chosen alterna­
tive is not empty, then the decision maker could choose an 
equally good or better alternative from that set. This could 
be the basis of recommendations to the decision maker. If 
the purpose of the investigation were to indicate ways in 
which the choices of the decision maker could be improved by 
altering the characteristics of the alternatives available to 
him or by altering the bounds of the feasible set, then a 
knowledge of those bounds and of the sets rejected by the 
decision maker in order to maximize a single characteristic 
would be helpful. 
Or suppose that the bounds of feasibility were altered, 
for example, by windfall income or emergency drains on time 
or money. A knowledge of the bounds of feasibility and of 
preference orderings would assist in predicting choice in the 
new situation. This might be a fifth area to examine. 
Finally, data on consumer's actual choices and their 
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preference orderings would furnish evidence as to the deci­
sion rules which they actually follow. This would be of 
considerable interest, since it might permit a general theory 
of choice behavior to be formulated on the basis of empirical 
evidence. 
12. Relationship between characteristics and objectives 
The theoretical basis of preference ordering needs 
further comment. To recapitulate, the decision situation is 
defined with respect to the decision maker and his objectives. 
His immediate objective determines a set of alternatives. 
Those actually considered, the feasible set, are defined with 
respect to the immediate objective, to the entire set of ob­
jectives held by the decision maker, and to the decision sit­
uation. Specifically, the set considered to be feasible in­
cludes only the alternatives which will (a) achieve for the 
immediate objective the minimum level of attainment accept­
able to the decision maker, and (b) permit a specified level 
of attainment for each of the other objectives. Both (a) and 
(b) are defined within a specific decision situation. 
The set of all characteristics may be divided into four 
subsets on the basis of their relationship with the immediate 
objective and the set of all objectives. Characteristic set 
A includes all those characteristics whose variation affects 
only the attainment of the immediate objective; characteristic 
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set B includes all those whose variation affects only the 
attainment of one or more objectives other than the immediate 
objective; characteristic set C includes all those character­
istics whose variation affects attainment of the immediate 
objective as well as of one or more other objectives; and 
characteristic set D includes all those whose variation af­
fects the attainment of no objective held by the decision 
maker. 
The effects of objectives on preference ranking of char­
acteristic variations may be seen from this classification. 
Characteristics in group A take their preference rank direct­
ly from the levels of the immediate objective to which they 
are attached. Characteristics in groups B and C take their 
preference rank from all the objectives to which they con­
tribute as well as from the immediate objective. These ob­
jectives must be weighted in some way according to the in­
tensity with which the decision maker desires their fulfill­
ment. Characteristics in group D cannot affect decision; 
their variants are indifferently preferred. 
A second distinction which is often made among charac­
teristics is durability with respect to achievement of the 
immediate objective. Some characteristics remain essen­
tially unchanged when the alternative to which they are 
attached is chosen and used to achieve the objective; others 
undergo material diminution or augmentation. This change 
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might have to do either with physical or preference order. 
If with physical order, anticipations of change affect pref­
erence orderings on which choice is based. 
Suppose that a characteristic belongs to group A, whose 
variation affects only the immediate objective. In this case 
durability is immaterial, since increase or decrease has no 
effect on any other objective. If the time period pertaining 
to the immediate objective were one day, then the decision 
maker would not care whether the characteristic lasted beyond 
that day or not. But suppose on the second day he wished to 
fulfill an objective identical with the immediate objective, 
for which the characteristic, if enduring, might be utilized. 
Since the time period is different, the objective is differ­
ent, and any characteristics which contribute to both objec­
tives must belong to group C, containing those whose varia­
tion affects the immediate objective and one or more other 
ones. If an objective is duplicated in succeeding time pe­
riods, any characteristic which contributes only to the im­
mediate objective must be one which is reduced to nothing in 
the time period that objective covers. 
If a characteristic is unchanged by fulfillment of any 
objective, then preference for variations of the character­
istic are based directly on the level of attainment of the 
immediate objective to which it contributes. If it does not 
affect the level of the immediate objective, then the 
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decision maker is indifferent to it. 
If a characteristic is changed by fulfillment of the 
immediate objective, then preference for variations of the 
characteristic are based on the level of attainment to which 
it contributes of all those objectives affected by its vari­
ation. These objectives must be weighted in some way by the 
decision maker's relative preference for each. In a real 
situation during a single time period, the decision maker 
must decide among various levels of objectives for that time 
period and in future ones. 
13. Relationships among characteristics, alternatives, and 
planes 
Suppose that the decision maker considers a set of planes 
of living, of which each element (plane) in the set is a par­
ticular level of fulfillment of each possible objective at 
each successive small period of time, beginning with that 
immediately following choice and continuing for many periods 
of time. Suppose that the set of planes is a universal set 
which includes all conceivable planes or combinations of ob­
jective fulfillment. This set will be very large; however, 
many of these planes will be impossible to attain due to con­
straints on characteristics. Suppose that these constraints 
are identified for all time periods; then the universal set 
of planes can be partitioned into two sets. Of these, one, 
called the feasible set, contains only those planes which 
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satisfy all constraints over all time periods, and the other 
contains only those planes which fail to satisfy a constraint 
in some time period. The second set may be dismissed from 
further consideration. 
Suppose that the decision maker is able to order all 
planes in the feasible set according to his preference. In 
each alternative which he considers, characteristics are 
present at some physical measure. If the decision maker 
chooses alternative I, he in effect chooses a subset of 
planes consisting of those planes in which each of the char­
acteristics is present in the physical measure associated 
with alternative I. But each characteristic variant asso­
ciated with I is also included in a larger subset of planes 
consisting of those planes in which that particular charac­
teristic is present in the measure associated with alterna­
tive I but other characteristics may be in any feasible 
measure. The rank associated with the most preferred plane 
in the first set of planes is the rank associated with al­
ternative I, but the most preferred plane in the second set 
gives its preference rank to the single characteristic vari­
ant common to all the planes included in it. 
Next, consider alternative II. It also is associated 
with a set of planes, and each of its characteristics vari­
ants are associated with a set of planes. Suppose that the 
characteristic to be examined is that of money cost of al­
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ternatives. The money cost of alternative I is associated 
with a set of planes and the money cost of alternative II is 
also associated with a set of planes, many of which may also 
be included in the set belonging to I. But if a single plane 
associated with the money cost of alternative II is more 
highly preferred to any plane included in the set associated 
with the money cost of alternative I, then the money cost of 
II is preferred to the money cost of I. Similarly if any 
plane in the set associated with alternative I is more highly 
preferred than any plan,in the set associated with alterna­
tive II, then alternative I is preferred. 
By considering the set of planes associated with each 
characteristic variant, complete preference orderings for 
the variants of any characteristic might be obtained, based 
on preferences for planes. In the same way, preference or­
derings for alternatives might be obtained. But suppose that 
for some reason the decision maker prefers not to examine the 
set of planes of living in order to obtain preference order­
ings of characteristics. This approach would, after all, re­
quire that he comprehend and evaluate an extremely large 
quantity of information. To avoid the necessity for gather­
ing and processing all this information, the decision maker 
might adopt certain conventions with respect to the prefer­
ence orderings of characteristics. For example, he may ob­
serve that a smaller unit price on any one commodity 
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purchased usually enables him to achieve a more highly pre­
ferred plane ; therefore he might adopt the convention that 
he always prefers a lower unit price. Similarly he might 
adopt conventions about other characteristics. These con­
ventions enable him to specify preference orderings of ele­
ments in a characteristic set without defining precisely the 
planes of which these elements form a part. 
But if the decision maker orders the elements of each 
characteristic set without identifying them with planes, then 
he has no common preference scale for measuring all charac­
teristics for the purpose of ordering alternatives. There­
fore, he must employ a decision rule in order to arrive at a 
choice, except in the special situation in which one alterna­
tive has the highest preference rating in all its character­
istics . 
To help clarify the foregoing, consider the following 
decision situations. In each situation, there are s planes 
to consider and these are ordered by preference and labeled 
Pi, P2,•••j Ps• The decision maker considers three alterna­
tives, each of which has three characteristics. With each 
level of each alternative there is associated the subset of 
planes of which it forms a part. For the sake of simplicity, 
assume that if a characteristic variant is a part of any 
particular plane, it is also a part of all planes less pre­
ferred than that one; therefore the subset of planes with 
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Table 2. Example of alternatives ordered by preferences 
among characteristic variants and among planes of 
living 
Rank of preferred plane 
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which that variant is associated can be identified merely by 
mentioning the most preferred member of the set. The highest 
plane is also the rank of the characteristic variant asso­
ciated with it. Table 2 summarizes this. 
In I the characteristic elements are randomly associated 
with subsets of planes. Although alternative 3 is really the 
one enabling the decision maker to achieve the most highly 
preferred plans of living (plane 5), this is not evident if 
each characteristic set is ordered separately. In fact, al­
ternative 3 is second best with respect to characteristics 1 
and 3 and third best with respect to characteristic 2. It is 
only when all three characteristics are taken into considera­
tion and are ordered on the same preference scale that it 
becomes evident that a^ is the best the decision maker can 
do. The relative importance of characteristics is implicit 
in the ordering of the set of planes. 
II shows the situation in which a^ is most preferred in 
all characteristics and can be identified as the most pre­
ferred alternative without the use of any decision rule. Ill 
shows the situation in which a single characteristic Co is 
the constraining one. In this situation the most preferred 
alternative can be identified by considering only C3. 
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B. Choice Under Conditions of Incomplete Information 
The assumption of complete information and certainty is 
highly unrealistic. In a few situations the decision maker 
may gather and evaluate a large amount of information, so 
large as to be complete; but in the majority of situations 
the decision maker is likely to choose on the basis of in­
complete and uncertain information. There are two reasons 
for the decision maker's willingness to act with incomplete 
information: one is the difficulty of distinguishing correct 
information from that which is incorrect; the other is the 
cost, including time, money and effort, of completing in­
formation fields. Because of the first reason, complete in­
formation is difficult or impossible to obtain, but for 
simplicity one might put the two reasons together and assume 
that the difficulties of obtaining information could all be 
overcome at some cost. 
1. Assumptions 
The first assumption about the uncertainty situation is 
that all the elements and relations discussed in the certain­
ty situation do, in reality, exist in the uncertainty situa­
tion as well. This is equivalent to assuming that relations 
are not changed in the process of gaining completeness, they 
are merely comprehended. Devices used to obtain information, 
such as laboratory tests or opinion survey, are assumed to do 
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no more than make apparent information which existed already 
and would have become apparent had events followed a natural 
course. 
The complete mapping of all elements and relationships 
in the decision situation, including relations within and 
among alternatives, may be called for the purposes of the 
present model the real field of choice. The decision maker 
does not make his decision from this real field, though his 
choice is an element of that real field and subject to all 
its relationships. The decision maker is able to consider 
only a portion of the real field, that portion which is 
mapped onto what might be termed his information field. This 
is a partial mapping of the elements and relationships of the 
real field, together with false elements and relationships 
mapped onto the information field from various incorrect 
perceptions. Obviously there might be error in either public 
information, in the transformation of it into individual in­
formation, or in both. 
A second assumption about the uncertainty situation is 
that any part of the real field may be mapped onto the in­
formation field, but that such an extension or revision of 
the mapping involves a cost. This is true even if the in­
formation is incorrect, though incorrect information may be 
less costly to obtain. The costs of mapping are changes in 
the relationships in the real field, especially changes in 
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the bounds of the feasible set of alternatives. 
A third assumption is that all characteristics are known 
to the decision maker, but not all relationships. For exam­
ple, he knows that a commodity has a money cost; he may not 
know what that cost is. He knows, that a collection of com­
modities are capable of fulfilling an objective to some de­
gree,. but may not be certain as to the precise degree. He 
has the basic ingredients for interpreting any situation; 
what is lacking is measurements. 
Finally, the decision maker is assumed to be able to 
order those planes of consumption with which he is familiar 
according to his preference. The number of planes mapped on 
his information field may be very small or very large; their 
mapping may be nearly complete for a few planes, skimpy for 
others. It is reasonable to suppose that the mapping will 
be most complete for those planes within a narrow rnage of 
his own plane, and least complete for planes having many ele­
ments outside this range. 
Experience is a source of information about planes of 
living. It includes printed matter, both fiction and factual 
reports, pictures, spoken communications, and personal ob­
servation. Because of his incomplete mapping of planes, the 
decision maker cannot know his preference ordering for char­
acteristics with certainty. At best he can do no more than 
estimate the probability that a characteristic is attached to 
142 
a range of planes. He knows that it belongs to certain parts 
of planes, but unless he knows with certainty the highest 
plane to which the characteristic belongs, he cannot know 
his preference with certainty. 
2. Relationships under uncertainty or risk 
Under these assumptions, analysis proceeds in a rela­
tively straightforward way. The decision maker senses a 
choice to be made with reference to some objective. Decision 
in uncertainty is carried on as a multi-stage process, in 
which the early stages are decisions with respect to extend­
ing information mapping. 
The decision maker may be visualized as attaching to 
each relationship measure in his information set a probabil­
ity between and including zero and one. This probability is 
his estimate of the likelihood that the measure corresponds 
to reality. The probability might be attached to a point 
estimate or a confidence interval estimate. If the decision 
maker is unable to estimate the probability that a measure is 
correct, that is, if he is in a state of uncertainty about 
the relation, he has several alternative strategies of eval­
uating the uncertain relation. One strategy is to postpone 
the evaluation until some preliminary decisions are acted on 
and their outcomes are known. This strategy includes de­
cisions to seek information deliberately, but the activity 
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•may also be extended through time In such a way that informa­
tion gained in performing early stages of the activity can be 
utilized in decisions about the later stages. The decision 
maker might decide on the early stages in detail but preserve 
some freedom to revise decisions about later states as in­
formation became available. 
A second strategy for handling uncertainty is to ignore 
the uncertain relationships and make the decision on the 
basis of other information. A third strategy is to adopt 
some randomly arrived at or conventional estimate of the re­
lationship. For example, where probabilities are unknown, 
assume that each alternative is equally likely. 
3. Decision rules 
The decision rules formulated for the complete informa­
tion case apply equally to the case of incomplete information 
but, since the information mapping is expressed in terms of 
probabilities, the decision maker must apply an additional 
decision rule concerning probabilities. There are three 
types of these probability rules which might be applied by 
the decision maker. 
Type I: Maximize the probability that the chosen al­
ternative is the preferred one. In this type are included 
all rules which maximize expected utility, including those 
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by LaPlace1, Savage2, and Shackle^. 
Type II: Maximize the probability that the chosen al­
ternative belongs to some specified subset of alternatives. 
This type includes the Wald maximin criterion^, the Savage 
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minimax principle , Simon's satisficing criterion , and the 
Hurwitz pessimism-optimism index rule^. 
Type III: Maximize the probability that the chosen al­
ternative is the preferred alternative subject to the condi­
tion that there is a specified probability that the chosen 
alternative belongs to a specified subset of alternatives. 
In general, Type II rules have the advantage that the 
decision maker can specify the subset of alternatives in such 
a way that when his evaluation is made after choice, he can 
perceive whether or not the chosen alternative was in fact a 
^"William Feller. An introduction to probability theory 
and its applications. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. New York, N. Y., 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1957. p. 113-
2 L. J. Savage. Foundations of statistics. New York, 
N. Y., John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1954. p. 140. 
3q. L. S. Shackle. Expectations in economics. London, 
England, Cambridge University Press. 1949. pp. 10-31. 
^Savage, op_. cit., p. 184. 
5Ibid., p. 164. 
^Herbert A. .Simon. Models of man. New York, N. Y., 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1957. pp. 246-253. 
7Luce and Raiffa, op. cit., p. 282. 
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member of the specified subset. The simplest example is the 
two person game in which the payoff matrix is known. A 
player chooses with certainty that his payoff will be one of 
a set, but he does not know which one it will be. In a 
slightly more complex game situation in which he knows not 
only the payoff sets pertaining to each of his alternatives 
but also the probability of obtaining each payoff given that 
the alternative was chosen, the decision maker might decide 
on a range of acceptable payoffs and choose the alternative 
in which the probability that the payoff would be included in 
that range was at a maximum. 
If the decision maker uses a Type I rule, he can seldom 
know with certainty whether or not he did in fact choose the 
alternative he would have preferred in the complete informa­
tion situation. If he uses Type III rule, he can know whether 
the alternative belonged to the specified subset, but usually 
not whether it was the preferred alternative. 
The advantage derived from knowing whether choice was 
successful, that is, whether the chosen alternative was the 
preferred alternative or from the preferred set, is that it 
may enable the decision maker to improve later decisions by 
enlarging his information field. For this reason, Type II or 
III rules may be preferable. 
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4. Application of Incomplete information model in research 
At this stage of research into consumer choice behavior, 
decision rules relative to risk are probably of little in­
terest because the body of data to fit models of such refine­
ment is insufficient. It seems more reasonable to label every 
information bit as certain or uncertain and assume that the 
decision maker bases choice only on certain information. Sub­
tleties due to allowances for risk would be hard to detect 
and might add little to the accuracy of the findings. 
The decision maker could reasonably be assumed to con­
sider the relationship having the highest probability of 
being true as a certain one; or, if the probability of being 
correct was low, to consider the relationship as uncertain. 
If uncertain, he might ignore it or defer final decision, at 
least on actions depending on the uncertain relationship. It 
might be important, therefore, for the researcher to gather 
evidence for the certainty or uncertainty attached by the 
decision maker to information, and also to differentiate de­
cisions as to the stages in which they are actually made. 
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IX. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL IN RESEARCH 
In the preceding chapters a terminology of choice was 
defined and some theoretic relationships were examined. In 
the present chapter some practical considerations will be 
explored relative to applying the model in research. These 
considerations will be categorized as content areas to which 
the model is applicable, data selection, and research objec­
tives to be achieved by the analysis of data. 
A. Areas of Applicability 
Choices may be viewed from different points of view as 
well as with differing content. One such point of view is 
that of the decision maker himself. The consumer is a de­
cision maker; so also are producers and distributers of con­
sumer goods. Members of each of these groups analyze choice 
with the purpose of understanding and improving the effec­
tiveness of their own choices. A second point of view is 
that of the producer or distributer in making those choices 
whose effectiveness in obtaining desired outcomes depends on 
accurate prediction of the choices of consumers. A third 
point of view is that of the governmental policy maker, whose 
job is to mediate between choice makers with conflicting in­
terests. This last point of view involves both the under­
standing and the accurate prediction of choices. 
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1. Purposes of analysis 
Choice behavior may be studied for a variety of purposes 
which may be classified as follows : 
1. to improve ability to identify the optimum choice 
among alternatives, 
2. to improve accuracy of predictions about choices of 
others, 
3. to improve ability to identify optimum choice when 
this depends on the choices of others. 
As an example of the third purpose, consider the policy 
maker who is interested in promoting economic growth. He 
must take into consideration probable choices in several 
sectors of the economy if a particular action policy is put 
into effect. The policy may affect other choice makers 
directly in several ways : (a) by altering the constraints on 
the set of feasible choices, (b) by altering the physical 
measures of characteristic variants, (c) by altering pref­
erences among variants, and (d) by altering the decision 
maker's information set. Obviously, the policy may have in­
direct effects, for if some choices are based on predictions 
of the choices of others, and if those other choices are 
affected by the policy, then choices based on predictions of 
those other choices are affected as well. The consuming 
sector, the producing sector, the marketing sector, the fi­
nancial sector, and all other identifiable sectors will each 
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adapt their choices to the new policy, presumably in accord­
ance with their own interests. The policy maker must esti­
mate the scope and direction of adaptations to direct and in­
direct effects, predict the choices which will be made, and 
evaluate the choices with respect to economic growth and 
perhaps with respect to other criteria. 
To continue the example, suppose the policy had to do 
with regulating the marketing of pork. On the one hand, the 
policy maker would need to predict the choices which market­
ers of pork would make with respect to quantities, forms and 
conditions at which pork would be offered at retail; on the 
other hand, the policy maker would need to estimate the con­
sumer demand for pork under the changed circumstances. There 
might be changes in prices, but not necessarily. Demand 
analysis can be used to predict choices as they respond to 
changes in income or prices, but neither change might be in­
volved here. Theories of profit optimization are useful in 
predicting the choices of business firms under changed con­
ditions of cost or demand but, again, neither change might 
be involved. 
The approach suggested in this dissertation would be 
clumsy to use in studying the response of aggregate demand 
to price changes in a well established product, but it might 
be used to study choices to which demand analysis does not 
apply. An example of this is the case where demand changes 
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In response to factors other than price or income. Similar­
ly., it should be useful in analyzing the manner in which 
factors other than money enter into choices made by firms or 
governmental agencies. The suggested area of application of 
the model is in the study of individual consumer decisions, 
either for predictive or normative purposes. Some examples 
of decisions in this area are given in the next section. 
2. Content of choice 
Decisions to purchase major items of consumption are 
well worth study because they are likely to exemplify delib­
erate decision making, because they have a considerable ef­
fect on the welfare of consumers, and because decisions in 
other economic sectors are based on predictions about them. 
One decision of this type which might be examined is the de­
cision as to whether or not the family should purchase a 
second automobile and, if they do so, what kind to purchase. 
In making this decision, the family is likely to survey its 
needs, interests, abilities and objectives with some care and 
choose from among alternatives on the basis of the relevant 
elements in its situation. Many families need a second 
automobile to help them carry on their chosen activities. 
If the wife works away from home, she may need separate 
transportation to her job. If she participates in community 
activities, she may find that her needs for transportation 
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conflict with those of her husband. As the children reach 
their late teens, they also have pressing needs for automo­
bile transportation. 
The increase in disposable income for families in the 
United States has made it possible for many families to buy 
a second car, and the wide variety of cars on the market has 
enabled them to choose cars which closely fit their respec­
tive needs and resources. These are a few of the reasons why 
there is much to be learned from a study of the decision to 
buy a second automobile, both by way of describing and ex­
plaining current needs and behavior of families and as a 
basis for predicting future behavior. 
Another pertinent type of decision has to do with main­
taining and building up inventories of consumer goods. Many 
commodities are purchased as replacements of commodities 
previously used. In this situation, an important part of the 
total decision has been the decision to discard the older 
commodity. Discard is used here as a term to designate any 
new disposition of the commodity, either to a new ownership 
or to uses other than the original one. 
Some commodities, for example, washing machines, are 
often bought as replacements for possessions which are being 
transferred to a new ownership or destroyed. Others, such as 
clothing, are bought either to supplement or to replace gar­
ments which the decision maker already owns. In either case, 
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the decision to discard possessions is significant in deter­
mining the behavior of the decision maker and may be more 
intimately associated with needs and preferences than are de­
cisions to purchase new commodities. The problem of control­
ling inventories of consumer goods takes on more and more 
priority in the minds of decision makers. Several causes 
contribute to this effect; among them cost of storage space, 
increasing geographic mobility of families, and property in­
surance rate increases are significant. 
Consumers make many decisions regarding the use and 
maintenance of the goods which they own. One decision of 
this type is the choice of whether or not to expend resources 
in order to keep up the appearance and working efficiency of 
a possession, or to "use up" its value and then replace it. 
One consumer with whom the writer is acquainted wears an in­
expensive watch which she never has cleaned or repaired. In­
stead she buys a new watch every few years. She feels that 
this plan has the advantage of variety and is no more costly 
than buying and maintaining a more expensive watch. In the 
case of commodities such as electrical appliances for which 
repairs may be expensive and difficult to obtain, the cost 
and inconvenience of repairing the old one may be little less 
than that of replacing it. Or, again, the choice may be be­
tween repairing a commodity or using it in a state of dis­
repair. Elderly persons who own their own homes may decide 
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to allow deterioration rather than allocate part of their 
income to maintaining the value of their property. Such 
choices have implications for the design of products and 
arrangements for financing their purchase and maintenance. 
Another type of decision has to do with obtaining and 
using resources. For example, should the decision maker im­
prove his abilities to perform certain actions which facili­
tate consumption? Should he use more of his time and energy 
in order to get more consumer goods? Should he use his re­
sources to obtain goods which yield no immediate satisfaction 
but which can be used to obtain other consumer goods? And, 
on the other hand, how should resources be allocated among 
alternative ways of obtaining consumer goods? Should the 
home maker use her time and energy to clean her house, should 
she hire someone else to clean, or should she use money to 
obtain devices which will reduce the time and energy neces­
sary to clean her home? The choices which consumers make in 
response to these questions determine the kinds of products 
and services which should be offered on the market and the 
educational and service facilities which are needed, and also 
the role of the government in promoting consumer welfare by 
means of regulation of the production, marketing, and use of 
goods. 
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3. Conditions to be met 
If a decision is a real decision, that is, if the de­
cision maker is aware of and chooses among several alterna­
tives, the proposed model applies, regardless of whether the 
choice stands alone or is one of a chain of choices as it 
might be in managerial activity. If the choice is a member 
of a chain or cluster of choices, the researcher must be 
careful to distinguish the characteristics which belong to 
one choice situation from those which do not, and the alter­
natives which the decision maker considers in making one de­
cision from those considered in other decisions. 
In research which included an entire cluster or chain 
of choices, the researcher might analyze each decision sep­
arately, or, if the decision maker's information map did not 
change markedly during the decision period, he might analyze 
the entire set of decisions as though it were a single de­
cision. If the information map did change from one sub­
sidiary decision to the next, and this affected the number of 
alternatives considered and the preference ordering of char­
acteristics, it would be more realistic to analyze each sub­
sidiary decision separately. 
A cluster or chain of choices may be analyzed as a sin­
gle choice provided that the set of alternatives is exhaus­
tive and mutually exclusive, that is, the set must be defined 
in such a way that the decision maker (a) can choose only one 
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alternative and (b) must choose from that set. If the al­
ternatives are not so defined, then preferences among vari­
ants of characteristics are not comparable because mutual 
exclusiveness is not fulfilled, or the calculated probabili­
ties that the different alternatives will be chosen are in­
correct because the set is not exhaustive, or both. 
The error of treating as two decisions that which was 
made as a single decision is probably not serious. If the 
analysis is accurate, the same results should be reached 
whether the decision was regarded as single or double, pro­
vided that the conditions of mutual exclusiveness and ex-
haustiveness are satisfied. 
The danger of including extraneous elements in the de­
cision situation is that the preference for extraneous ele­
ments will depend on unidentified objectives. If choices of 
a random sample of decision makers were examined, one would 
expect their preference rating for extraneous elements to be 
randomly distributed in the same manner as unimportant char­
acteristics, but this might be not the case. An extraneous 
element might be generally ranked low or high, not because it 
bore any relation to the objective under investigation, but 
because some unstated objectives were held in common by the 
decision makers. 
The converse error is to fail to include all elements 
pertinent to a decision. The only means of checking on this 
156 
is to examine the consistency of the model for predicting 
or explaining actual choices. If interest centers on regu­
larities in the choice behavior of a sample of persons, there 
is probably less danger that elements influencing their 
choice will be omitted than if the choice of a single person 
were examined. 
The analysis of choice is less applicable to habitual 
behavior than to that pertaining to deliberate decisions. 
Even habitual behavior which is based on some previous de­
cision is not necessarily identical with behavior which the 
decision maker would have exhibited had he made a new de­
cision. Perceived cues in the situation might be the same as 
those which he had taught himself to recognize as signals 
of the original situation, but other elements might be 
changed in such a way that some other alternative would now 
be preferred. In analyzing habitual behavior which is based 
on an earlier decision, the researcher takes the risk that 
the situation may have changed sufficiently that the chosen 
behavior is not consonant with the decision maker's prefer­
ences . 
Habitual behavior is abandoned or modified when condi­
tions change markedly, but there may be a delay in this 
response. If the purpose of the research worker is to pre­
dict future behavior, he may find that his predictions are 
inaccurate even when conditions have not changed from those 
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in effect when he obtained his data. This could be due to an 
adaptation delayed until after he collected his data. If, 
on the other hand, the researcher wishes to study choices 
with a view to making normative recommendations, he may find 
that the decisions he studied were habitual choices which did 
not accurately reflect decision makers' real preferences and, 
therefore, any recommendations based on these choices would 
be at fault. 
B. Selection of Data 
Having decided on the type of decision which he will 
study, the research worker must decide what data he needs in 
order to analyze choices adequately. In order to do this, he 
should define or identify the scope of the decision, appli­
cability of the model to the decision, data necessary for 
analysis, optimum timing of data collection, optimum sources 
of data. These depend upon the content of the problem in 
which the researcher is interested and upon purposes of his 
investigation. 
1. Necessary data 
Several types of data are pertinent to the analysis of 
choice : 
1. qualifying criteria, 
2. physical characteristics of alternatives, 
3. preference orderings of characteristic variants. 
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4. chosen alternative, 
5. physical characteristics of the decision situation, 
6. constraints. 
These types are not necessarily listed in the order in which 
the data would be sought. Questionnaires or interview sched­
ules should be organized in such a way as to minimize bias 
and error in the responses. 
In order to observe regularities in behavior, some vari­
ables must be controlled in order that the effects of other 
variables may be compared. In general the fewer uncontrolled 
variables there are in the situation, the more precisely can 
effects be measured. The sample might be limited to a popu­
lation of those decision makers choosing a particular alter­
native, to those confronted with an identical set of alter­
natives, or to those in decision situations similar in spe­
cific respects. The qualifying criteria may be physical 
characteristics of the alternatives, of the decision situa­
tion, or of the chosen alternative. 
Physical characteristics of each alternative in the set 
should be identified and measured. The research worker has 
three alternative ways by which he may decide on the identity 
of characteristics : (a) follow some logical scheme, (b) 
identify characteristics as nearly as possible after the 
manner in which decision makers identify them, or (c) identify 
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them in such a manner as to make measurement most convenient, 
precise, or consistent. Each of these ways has its own ad­
vantages and limitations. Perhaps the easiest way to identi­
fy all characteristics is to follow a logical plan; however, 
if the resulting set of characteristics is defined different­
ly from those characteristics as the decision maker defines 
them, the preference orderings of the decision maker may not 
be completely applicable. The characteristic as defined by 
the decision maker may be difficult to identify precisely and 
to measure consistently. Characteristics should be identi­
fied in such a way as to conform with logical criteria and 
conditions necessary for precise, unambiguous, and consistent 
measurement and at the same time to preserve the applicabili­
ty of preference orderings. 
Particular preference orderings may be assumed from evi­
dence not included in the study, from responses to questions 
designed to indicate the decision maker's general preference 
structure, or from responses to specific and detailed ques­
tions about preferences. Preference orderings may also be 
reconstructed or confirmed through analysis of physical char­
acteristics, actual choice, and constraints. Suppose, for 
example, that actual choices were noted in situations in 
which the feasible set was made successively smaller. Then, 
disregarding those characteristics on which constraints had 
been changed, some other characteristics of the chosen 
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alternative should show a consistent trend in variation as 
the more stringent constraints forced the decision maker to 
choose less and less preferred variations of those character­
istics . 
If he wishes to gather data concerning specific decision 
rules, the research worker must identify the alternative 
which decision makers actually choose. The chosen alterna­
tive may be identified by observation of overt behavior or by 
simply asking decision makers what they choose, what they 
expect to choose, or what they would choose in a hypothetical 
situation. All alternatives included in the analysis should 
be defined at the same operational level as the chosen alter­
native. Because the chosen alternative may have already been 
acted upon or have been considered in great detail with 
respect to action, it may be easy to specify minutely the 
operations included in that alternative, while other alterna­
tives can be described only sketchily. Similarly, there may 
be a chain of subordinate decisions stemming from the origi­
nal decision and confirming every aspect of carrying out the 
alternative. Unless this chain of decisions can be identi­
fied adequately for each of the original alternatives, it may 
be better to ignore them or treat them as separate decisions. 
Including data pertaining to a chain of decisions as part of 
one alternative without including similar data for all may 
make the alternatives noncomparable in some characteristics. 
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Data about physical characteristics of the decision sit­
uation and constraints have been listed as separate types, 
but they are really ways of getting data about the same 
thing. What the researcher would like to know is the precise 
identity and measurement of constraints which limit the de­
cision maker's feasible set. Whatever direct evidence he can 
get he should use. But where constraints are hard to identi­
fy or precise measurements of them are lacking, measurements 
of the physical characteristics of the decision situation may 
furnish indirect evidence about constraints. 
For example, suppose the decision of interest' had to do 
with buying a toaster. The alternatives might differ with 
respect to money cost. The constraint related to this char­
acteristic would be the amount of uncommitted income in the 
hands of the decision maker. If this were not known, the 
total income of thé decision maker would be useful in con­
structing a demand function for toasters. 
The research worker may measure some physical character­
istics of the decision situation because he believes they are 
related to constraints which he is unable to identify. For 
example, he may observe that purchases of consumer durables 
fluctuate with the business cycle. Without being able to 
define the nature of the constraint which produces this ef­
fect, he may still find it useful to include in his model a 
measure of general business conditions. 
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2. Sources of data 
The model is intended, not as a guide to discovering the 
actual thought processes a decision maker goes through, but 
as an aid to identifying factors which are associated with 
• specific choices. However, the decision maker can only be 
influenced through his information set. If he believes a 
characteristic enters the situation in zero degree, his de­
cision is made on that basis, regardless of the true measure. 
In collecting data the research worker must take into con­
sideration the problem of incomplete information on the part 
of decision makers. 
How the researcher resolves the problem of incomplete 
information depends on his purpose in doing the study. If 
he wishes to learn the nature of decision rules followed by 
decision makers, he may base his analysis on the decision 
maker's description of the situation and his alternatives. 
These data may be biased or incomplete because the decision 
maker may be unable or unwilling to put into words every as­
pect of the decision; therefore, the questions must be se­
lected and framed with care. If the research worker can ob­
tain an approximately correct report, it will not have the 
fault of exaggerating the extent of correct information on 
which choice was based. 
However, if the purpose of the analysis is to predict 
future choices, the research worker cannot confine his data 
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to subjective measures of characteristics as reported by de­
cision makers. He needs a precise and consistent measure as 
well. For some purposes, such as conventional demand analy­
sis, only the latter measure is needed. Analysis of choice 
for purposes of prediction could be refined and made more 
exact by including measures of information in order to esti­
mate the effects on actual choice of different incomplete in­
formation mappings. 
These are some considerations in designing a study of 
choice. If the research problem has been defined with suf­
ficient precision, it is relatively easy to distinguish be­
tween pertinent and irrelevant data. It is not so easy to 
decide among several alternative methods of measuring char­
acteristics of the decision situation. The best method is 
the one which probably will give the most adequate solution. 
Where the researcher has several purposes or is uncertain 
which method is best for a particular purpose, he may measure 
characteristics in several ways. In this case, a comparison 
of analyses based on alternatives measures could yield use­
ful guides for subsequent research. 
3. Timing of data collection 
Investigations of choice might be either ex post or ex 
ante, that is, data might be collected either before or after 
choice. If before, then the assumption must be made that 
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data collected are applicable to that choice. Several in­
fluences might make it inapplicable. Either physical or 
preference measures of characteristics might change between 
the time the measurement was taken and the time of choice. 
The decision maker himself might not be able to assess his 
own preferences until the moment of choice. Constraints may 
also be unpredictable, that is, the decision maker might not 
be able to predict in advance how much time or money he would 
be able to allocate to any particular choice. 
If data are collected after choice is made, then ele­
ments may be forgotten or misrepresented. The decision maker 
might tend to justify his choice by reporting limitations or 
preferences incorrectly. Because he now has information 
which he did not possess at the moment of choice, he might 
explain his choice in other terms than he would have origi­
nally. Or, because he is dissatisfied with his choice, he 
might report preference orderings which do not reflect the 
influences which determined his choice. If the analysis is 
based on other evidence that that reported by the decision 
maker, there is the difficulty of including all influential 
elements. 
C. Objectives of Analysis 
After the data are collected, the analysis may proceed 
along the following lines: 
165 
1. Identify those characteristics of alternatives and 
of the decision situation which are related to the decision, 
that is, those characteristics whose variation is associated 
with variations of choice. 
2. Identify those characteristics which constrain the 
set of feasible alternatives and those which the decision 
maker attempts to maximize in his choice. 
3. Estimate the probability of each separate alterna­
tive being chosen, given particular sets of characteristic 
variants. From this an aggregate decision function could be 
fitted. 
4. Compare decision makers' information about character­
istics as they report it with objective measurements of the 
same characteristics. From this the amount of "error" in 
their choices might be estimated. By error is meant the 
difference between their actual choice and the choice they 
might have made had they possessed more correct information. 
This might be done by comparing their choices with those of 
better informed decision makers in the sample or with the 
recommendations of persons who are experts in that field. 
5. Examine the relationship between the physical and 
the preference orderings of particular characteristic vari­
ants. 
6. Compare the consistency of the choice made during 
the initial interview with the actual choice made later, and 
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of the initial and the ex post measurements of characteristic 
variants as reported by decision makers. An additional check 
would be on the compatibility of the actual choice with con­
straints reported during or inferred from the initial inter­
view. In cases where such incompatabilities are found, addi­
tional data might be sought to explain why choice was possi­
ble. 
Study of choice behavior should provide conclusions on 
several levels : 
1. It should yield useful descriptive data concerning 
the practices of consumers and the situations within which 
they make a particular type of choice. 
2. It should enable the research worker to test specif­
ic hypotheses. For example, hypotheses concerning the rela­
tionships between preference and physical measures, concern­
ing the characteristics which constrain choice or which the 
decision maker wishes to maximize, or concerning the effect 
of incomplete information might be tested. 
3. It should provide evidence on which to base hypoth­
eses concerning decision functions, individual or aggregate. 
These hypotheses should then be perfected and tested in 
further research, but even as hypotheses they might prove 
useful as a theoretic explanation of decision making and de­
cision making behavior. 
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D. A Proposed Application of the Model 
An area of choice to which the situational model dis­
cussed in the preceding chapters seems particularly well 
fitted is that concerned with product innovation and design. 
The outcome of such decisions may have considerable effect 
on the welfare both of consumers and of makers and distribu­
tors of products. On the one hand, the consumer's field of 
choice is limited to a large extent by the array of goods 
which are offered on the market. Within constraints imposed 
by his willingness and ability to expend money (assuming that 
this is a constraining factor), many combinations of other 
characteristics may be feasible; however, only a few of these 
combinations will be produced and marketed. It is to the 
consumer's interest to have those combinations offered him 
which most closely resemble his preference pattern for prod­
uct characteristics and which at the same time satisfy con­
straints on his field of choice. On the other hand, the 
makers and distributors of consumer goods base their deci­
sions with respect to product offerings partly on their 
knowledge of the preference patterns of consumers, 
Suppose that some research agency has been given the 
responsibility of advising a washing machine manufacturer 
regarding modifications in the design of his product. The 
manufacturer has identified six characteristics of home 
washing machines which seem worth study: 
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1. economy in initial money cost; 
2. economy in money cost of operation; 
3. dependability of operation; 
4. conservation of operator's time and energy; 
5. excellence of performance with respect to cleaning 
and preserving garments; and 
6. glamour. 
If money price is a constraining factor, then in a study 
of consumer choices at all prices, the effects of the money 
constraint will be confounded with the effects of preferences 
for other characteristics. For example, suppose the agency 
were to compare demand for washing machine model A, priced 
at $400 and having a high dependability, with model B, priced 
at $300 and having less dependability. One cannot know 
whether the consumers who chose model B did so because their 
preference for dependability was low or because the higher 
priced machine was not a feasible choice. For this reason, 
price elasticity of demand for washing machines might best 
be left for a separate investigation. 
The remaining five characteristics might be studied 
using the following procedure : Select a price range within 
which it seems unlikely that money constraints will be effec­
tive. Within this price range select several different makes 
and models of washing machines which, among them, represent 
the combinations being offered of the five characteristics. 
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Measure the number of units of each different machine sold 
during a specified time period. Devise a scale for measuring 
variation in each characteristic; the scale might be based on 
composite measures, but it should be constructed in such a 
way that differing positions on the scale represent corre­
sponding differences on the average consumer's preference 
scale. Calculate the elasticity of demand with respect to 
each characteristic. 
As outlined, the study would have several limitations. 
Some constraints might still influence choice and their ef­
fects be confounded with the effects of preference orderings. 
Also, decision makers are likely to have chosen under condi­
tions of incomplete information and for this reason their 
choices might not exactly correspond to their true prefer­
ences. And, finally, projections of demand for products 
having innovations whose variation exceeded that of the prod­
ucts studied might be doubtful. 
However, the investigation would have the advantage that 
some of the effects of constraining variables would be elimi­
nated. Demand responses to innovations should be more exact­
ly predictable, provided that these innovations could be 
measured on the scales devised to measure the five character­
istics studied. Thus, by taking several product character­
istics into consideration, by devising measuring scales which 
reflect consumer preferences, and by designing the 
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investigation in such a way as to minimize effects other 
than of preference, more predictable relationships between 
choice and variations in design should become apparent. 
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X. SUMMARY 
Consumer choice is a key determinant of welfare. Its 
outcome affects many individuals and organizations besides 
those immediately involved. Because of this, research in 
this area may serve a variety of purposes and include a wide 
range of content. Its purpose may be to describe, relate, 
compare, or contrast the elements of choice, and perhaps to 
make predictions. The content of these studies includes 
estimation of demand, measurement of utility, and description 
and analysis of consumer goals and values as well as of other 
factors related to choice, such as occupation or educational 
level. All of these studies have a basis in utility theory. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the con­
cepts used in analyzing consumer choice and, from them, to 
construct a model which can be applied in specific studies. 
Using the proposed approach, the researcher could base his 
descriptions and predictions of choice behavior and his 
recommendations for altering the conditions of choice upon a 
broad and inclusive analysis of situational factors which in­
fluence the decision maker. His results would supplement 
those from research based on other models. 
A model is defined in this study as a conceptual struc­
ture which enables a researcher to analyze in theoretic terms 
his data concerning the real world. On order for it to be a 
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useful and valid instrument in research, the model should be 
scientific rather than personal by satisfying the following 
three conditions. The model should be consistent,., both with­
in itself and with other scientific models. It should be 
capable of exact transmission, that is, any competent person 
should be able to apply the model to identical situations and 
reach identical conclusions. And, finally, rules specifying 
valid applications of the model to real situations should be 
included in the model or accepted generally among scientists. 
Using a model, specific problems may be formulated and 
their solutions identified. Scientific models have several 
advantages over personal ones with respect to problem solu­
tion. They may provide satisfactory solutions in a higher 
percentage of instances; their use demands less "flair" on the 
part of the researcher; and, most important, since perform­
ances are standardized, their errors can be estimated. 
The environment of choice includes the decision maker, 
his actions, perceptions and conceptualizations, and his real 
surroundings. As the central figure in his environment, he 
perceives patterns which enable him to predict the outcomes 
of his choices. Outcomes might be defined as unrealized por­
tions of pattern. Because the decision maker perceives him­
self in relation to his situation, he is able to order out­
comes according to his preferences. 
The interaction of the decision maker and his situation 
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may be conceptualized as his set of activities. These have 
certain characteristics such as regularity, duration and 
change, location in time and space, and level of elaboration 
which influence the preference order assigned to outcomes by 
the decision maker. These characteristics result from the 
interaction of activities in an over-all pattern called the 
plane of living. This is the universal set of activities be­
longing to a single decision maker in his lifetime. Situation 
is a perception of this plane under conditions of complete 
information and at a moment when a portion of the plane is 
still indeterminate and unrealized. The ultimate basis for 
preference among outcomes or characteristics of outcomes is 
the decision maker's preference ordering of planes of living. 
An element is any thing viewed as an entity. Three 
classes of elements are proposed as components of the choice 
problem. These are.objectives, alternatives, and character­
istics. An objective is the decision maker's concept of a 
desirable outcome. It may be formulated with conceptual or 
operational precision. An objective must be conceptually 
precise to serve as a guide for decision, operationally pre­
cise to serve as a guide for action. A decision maker is in­
fluenced by a number of objectives at any given time. The 
relationships among those objectives affect his preferences 
and choice. 
Alternatives are the elements among which the decision 
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maker chooses. They should be Identified in such a way that 
each variation is a separate alternative, otherwise it would 
not be meaningful to order them according to preference. 
Each alternative may be viewed as a bundle of characteristics, 
each with characteristic of an alternative having its counter­
part in every other alternative in the set. 
Elements within the choice situation may be related by 
common membership in a set, by being different measures of a 
common element, or by association with elements in another 
set. These relationships may be termed inclusion, measure, 
and mapping. Choice relationships may have physical content 
by being capable of exact duplication, and preference content 
by referring to comparisons with value standards, or time or 
space content. Physical orderings affect feasibility. Time 
and space relationships affect both feasibility and prefer­
ence for alternatives. 
Although global information describes outcomes which 
will actually be realized by given choices, the decision 
maker must often base his choice on less inclusive mappings. 
If his information is as correct and detailed as comprehen­
sive use of technology and keen observation permits, it might 
be termed complete information. The more likely case is in­
complete information. Completeness refers to the precision 
with which relationships are known; certainty and uncertainty 
of information refer to the degree of confirmation for 
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measurements of relations. Risk is the condition in which 
the decision maker can order different sets of relationship 
measures by the likelihood that they contain the real measure. 
Since the decision maker must choose from among alterna­
tives on the basis of the information which he has, it is 
necessary for the researcher either to identify that informa­
tion or make some assumption about it and its effect on the 
decision maker. In some cases a decision as to whether to 
choose immediately or to obtain more information before 
choosing may be made as a subsidiary to the main decision. 
In order to make his information about alternatives more 
certain or complete, the decision maker must undergo a cost. 
Since the extra cost incurred in obtaining information may 
limit the set of feasible alternatives, the effects of such a 
subsidiary decision must be taken into account in analyzing 
the main decision. 
If each characteristic in an alternative is a variant of 
a characteristic which enters into every alternative in the 
set, and if the decision maker is able to order these vari­
ants, then the set of alternatives is partially ordered. 
Using any single alternative as a reference point, the set 
can be partitioned into (a) those alternatives having a 
higher rank, (b) those having a lower rank, and (c) the re­
maining alternatives. Using characteristic variants as 
reference points, it is possible to identify the feasible 
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of alternatives, containing those which it is possible for 
the decision maker to choose, and the preferred subset, con­
taining those alternatives preferred in all characteristics 
to any alternative not in the preferred subset. 
If the preferred subset contains only one alternative, 
the decision maker should choose it. If not, he must base 
his choice on a decision rule. Three types of decision rules 
are suggested for the case of complete information and cer­
tainty: (a) the lexocographic rule ; (b) random choice; and 
(c) a complex function based on preference order and con­
straints on feasibility. In the risk situation, an addition­
al decision rule is needed. Again, the additional rule might 
be one of three types : (d) maximize the probability that 
the chosen alternative is included in some specified subset; 
and (f) maximize the probability that the chosen alternative 
is the preferred one subject to the requirement that the 
probability of the alternative being included in a specified 
subset is within some acceptable range. 
On the basis of relationships predicated in the model, 
research might be designed to identify those characteristics 
which constrain choice and those which the decision maker 
wishes to maximize, measure the association between prefer­
ence and physical measures, identify constraints, furnish 
evidence concerning the nature of decision rules, or estimate 
demand for commodities under varying conditions with respect 
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to maximized and constrained characteristics. This would 
make possible a better understanding of decision behavior, 
particularly with respect to the practices of consumers and 
the situations within which they can be expected to make 
particular kinds of choices. More exact prediction and 
wiser recommendations for action should result from an im­
proved understanding of the logic of choice. 
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XI. GLOSSARY 
Abstraction Set of essential qualities of a thing or things, 
considered apart from the thing itself. 
Acceptable Satisfying integral criteria of a model. 
Accuracy Exactness of conformity to real conditions. 
Activity A structure of acts, including some that are re­
source consuming. 
Admissible set Set of elements to which a problem is appli­
cable . 
Alternative One of a set of incongruous elements, each cap­
able of fulfilling a common objective in some degree. 
Each alternative is a structure including an activity of 
the decision maker which he might conceivably choose to 
perform, persons and material objects related to the 
activity, and time and space relationships. 
Application to reality Congruence of selected elements and 
relationships in a model with selected elements and re­
lationships perceived in a real situation. 
Bounds (of a set) Elements of a set whose relationship with 
other elements indicates whether or not those other ele­
ments are also members of the set. 
Certainty Condition in which the decision maker has a strong­
ly confirmed belief that a particular relationship falls 
within a subset of its universal set. The degree of 
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confirmation is such that belief is consistent with all 
other beliefs held with certainty within the model. 
Characteristic Any feature, trait, quality, or property 
which serves to classify an element. 
Characteristic set Set of elements, each recognizable as a 
perceivable characteristic of some alternative or ele­
ment of a decision situation, where the entire set is a 
single concept and elements within the set are referred 
to by a common name or by an indication of relationship 
to other elements in the set. 
Choice Selection of an alternative, with the entire decision 
implied in a static manner. 
Choice maker Individual who selects an alternative. 
Choice making Act of selecting an alternative. 
Choice making behavior Actions involved in or related to 
choice making, as perceived by an observer. 
Coherent Making a logical whole; consistent. 
Competing alternatives Alternatives belonging to a single 
decision situation. 
Competition Relationship between elements such that the in­
clusion of one in a structure renders the inclusion of 
the other less possible. 
Complementarity Relationship between elements such that the 
inclusion of both in a structure is associated with a 
valuation of either or both higher than the valuation 
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had only one been included. 
Complete ordering A set is completely ordered if, between 
any pair of elements in the set, one is either greater 
than, less than, or equal or indifferent to the others. 
Completeness of information field 
global Mapping on the information field of all relation­
ships within and among all elements in the alterna­
tives and the decision situation, no matter how 
these elements are defined. 
complete Mapping on the information field of all rela­
tionships within and among all elements in the al­
ternatives and the decision situation which it is 
possible for the decision maker to know, provided 
he is a keen and careful observer and has at his 
command all instruments which have been devised for 
the detection and measurement of relationships. 
partial Less than a complete mapping of the information 
field. 
Concept A mental image of an element and the characteristics 
and relationships essential to that element. 
Condition Specific measures of environmental relationships. 
Conditions to be met Conditions by which a set called an ad­
missible set is bounded. 
Congruence Equality of relationships. 
Consistency Congruity of parts. 
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internal Condition in which relationships among ele­
ments within a model remain effective for all meas­
ures of those relationships. 
external Condition in which relationships among ele­
ments within a model remain effective for all 
measures of relationships among elements in other 
models believed to be applicable. 
Constraining characteristics Characteristics having variants 
which form the bounds of the feasible set of alterna­
tives. 
Consumer (or consuming unit) The entity which consumes re­
sources and realizes outcome. 
Consumer behavior Those actions of the consumer which are re­
lated to consumption. 
Consumer choice Selection from among alternatives of which 
consumption is a part. 
Consumer goods Goods and services used up by the consumer in 
obtaining outcomes. 
Consumption The using up of resources, including commodities 
and services. 
Cost 
of information Change in characteristic variants at­
tached to alternatives or to the decision situation 
as a result of behavior by the consumer intended to 
make his information field more complete or certain. 
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of evaluating information Change in characteristic var­
iants attached to alternatives or to the decision 
situation as a result of valuation by the consumer 
of characteristic variants' or of partitioning the 
set of alternatives into subsets according to cer­
tain criteria, including criteria having to do with 
preference, with feasibility, or with certainty. 
Criterion Boundary of a set. 
Decision A dynamic view of a decision situation; a process, 
including identification of objectives and alternatives, 
gathering and evaluating information, and selecting an 
alternative. 
Decision making Performance of the steps in decision. 
Decision rule Set of criteria defined with operational pre­
cision and capable of identifying a solution for any 
admissible set of alternatives. 
Decision situation A situation including a set of alterna­
tives and all elements related to those alternatives. 
Description Identification of inclusion relationships. 
Durability Ability to continue in a particular condition; 
measure of change in characteristic variants due to the 
action of some agent. 
Dynamic Viewed as change or process. 
Effective Associated with variation in outcome. 
Effective variant One which is associated with a variation 
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in outcome for each alternative belonging to a set. 
Element A statement of a relationship; an embodiment of 
characteristics and relationships. 
Environment All real elements related to and including an 
individual and the relationships among and within those 
elements. 
Evaluation Ordering and partitioning a set according to 
preference relationships. 
Expenditure The using up of resources to obtain commodities 
and services. 
Factors Elements of a situation. 
Feasibility Capability of being effected. 
Field of choice Set of alternatives known to the decision 
maker; those mapped onto his information field. 
Hypothesis The postulate that some conclusion or premise of 
a model corresponds to some reality. 
Identification Perception of relationships. 
Information Facts or data concerning relationships and ele­
ments in the real world. 
correct Information consistent with the real outcome of 
choice. 
incorrect Information inconsistent with the real out­
come of choice. 
public Having to do with aggregates, averages, or types 
of situations. 
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Individualized Having to do with particular situations. 
Information field Information set pertaining to a single 
situation. 
Information problem Identification of condition when mapping 
of an information field is sufficiently complete and 
certain as to enable a satisfactory choice to be made. 
Information set Information known to an individual. 
Logic of choice Relationships between the chosen alternative 
and other elements in the decision situation. 
Maximized characteristic Characteristic whose most preferred 
variant from the feasible set is attached to the chosen 
alternative. 
Measure Ordering relationship among elements in a character­
istic set. 
cardinal Measure such that the ratio of two cardinal 
measures is subject to exact numerical calculation. 
ordinal Measure such that the ratio of two ordinal 
measures can be described but not subjected to 
exact numerical calculation. 
Measurement Perception of measure. 
Model An abstraction from a type of real situation. 
Objective Goal or purpose which the decision maker wishes to 
have accomplished. 
Objective measure Measure which has the characteristic of 
exact transmissibility to all persons familiar with the 
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model In which the measure occurs. 
Outcome State of affairs not adequately described in money 
terms, which measures fulfillment of objectives and 
which is regarded as the termination of consumption. 
Partial ordering A set is partially ordered if it can be 
divided into at least three subsets A, B, and C, such 
that for any elements a and b where a is a member of A 
and b is a member of B, a is greater than, equal to, or 
indifferent to b and b is less than, equal to, or in­
different to a, but this is not true of all possible 
pairs a and c or b and c, where c is a member of subset 
C. 
Partition Identify subsets. 
Pattern A set of situations separated in time and/or space, 
some elements in each situation being related to corre­
sponding elements in all other situations in the set. 
Perception The sensing of a structure of real or conceptual 
elements and relationships. 
Personal model A model not fulfilling some or all of the 
criteria for a scientific model. 
Physical relationships Relationships capable of objective 
measurement. 




conceptual Exact measurement of relationships pertain­
ing to a concept. 
operational Exact identification of conceptual with 
real elements and relationships. 
Preference relationships Ordering relationships derived from 
value standards. 
Problem An interrelated set of concepts, the complete state­
ment of which includes (a) identification of an admissi­
ble set of alternatives, and (b) a decision rule. 
Process Regular relationships among elements identified at 
different points in time. 
Rationality Consistency of choice behavior in a real situa­
tion with solution indicated by problem and model ac­
cepted as applicable. 
Real Having an actual as opposed to conceptual existence. 
Relationship Association of several elements in a particular 
manner. 
mapping Relationship between elements belonging to dif­
ferent sets. 
inclusion Relationship between elements of a set and 
the bounds of that set. 
Relevant set of alternatives Those feasible alternatives 
which are known to the decision maker, i.e., those al­
ternatives which are both elements of the feasible-set 
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and mapped onto the information field. 
Resources Real elements which are limited in quantity, have 
alternative uses, and can be combined in varying quanti­
ties in producing outcome. 
Risk Condition in which the decision maker believes but is 
not certain that a particular relationship falls within 
a subset of the set containing all perceivable varia­
tions of that relationship. He may be able to assign 
a probability measure to the degree of his belief. 
Satisfactory choice Choice which does in reality satisfy the 
criteria according to which it was chosen. 
Scientific model Model which is internally and externally 
consistent, precisely transmissible, and whose appli­
cability to real situations is governed by rules which 
are either part of the model itself or are part of the 
science to which the model belongs. 
Set Aggregate of elements having identifiable bounds. 
Situation "A number of stimuli, external to the organism 
but action upon it, organized as a unit and with a 
special relatedness to one another as stimuli of the 
specific organism involved.A set of interrelated 
elements having relationships with a decision maker. 
1James H. S. Bossard and Eleanor Stoker. The sociology 
of child development. 3rd ed. New York, N. Y., Harper and 
Brothers. 1961. pp. 16-17. 
Solution Subset of alternatives identified according to cri­
teria included in or implied by the problem. 
Space relationship Relationship describing extent and con­
tiguity of one element with respect to other elements at 
one point in time or apart from time. 
extent Degree and manner in which an element displaces 
other elements. 
contiguity Location of an element with respect to other 
elements. 
Static Viewed as a timeless organic whole, or viewed at some 
moment in time. 
Structure A set of interrelated elements. 
Subjective measure Measure which cannot be transmitted pre­
cisely. 
Subset Aggregate of bounded elements which are members of a 
set but whose bounds are not identical with the bounds 
of that set. 
Substitution Relationship between elements such that the in­
clusion of both in a structure is associated with a 
valuation of either or both lower than had only one been 
included. 
Theory A conceptual structure. 
Threshold effect Manifestation of the lack of ability of the 
decisionmaker to classify all elements into subsets of 
one, due to inability to measure relationships with 
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Infinite precision. 
Time relation Relation which describes duration or contigu­
ity in time of one relationship with respect to other 
relationships, apart from considerations of space. 
duration Permanence of relationships. 
contiguity Location of a relationship with respect to 
other relationships. 
Transmissibllity (of concepts) Capability of comprehension 
and use by persons other than the originator. 
Type Element or structure which is or is believed to be 
representative of some set of elements or structures. 
Uncertainty Condition in which either the decision maker has 
no reason to believe that a particular relationship 
falls within any particular subset of the universal set 
or the subset within which he believes the relationship 
to fall is so large that it cannot serve to classify 
alternatives into subsets. 
Universal, set Aggregate of all perceivable elements within 
the bounds of a set. 
Usefulness Capability of identifying satisfactory choices. 
Utility Measure associated with in value standards. 
Valuation Ordering according to value standards. 
Value standards Set of criteria which enable a decision 
maker to order elements in a set according to preference. 
Variant Specific measure of an element. 
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